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I 
THE great increase in recent years of the number of non-commercial, 
as well as commercial, bankruptcies 1 is doubtless one reason why 
public and official attention has been directed to bankruptcy reform. 
But reformers for the most part have assumed that the bankruptcy 
power in all respects should continue to be exercised by the Federal 
government and have neglected to appraise the functions which 
bankruptcy performs or might perform in our economic order. Bank- 
ruptcy, like other institutions, has a curious way of becoming suf- 
ficient unto itself. Its functions, the problems with which it deals, 
its purposes, the relationships between it and current economic and 
social conditions are lost sight of or assume a minor position.2 
Attention, energy and resources are directed towards making the 
institution internally more efficient, so that its business may be 
expedited and its abuses eliminated. This is reflected in part by the 
not uncommon feeling that the pressing problem of bankruptcy is to 
remove ambiguities in various sections of the act so as to make bank- 
ruptcy a less confusing or less strenuous game. Or, again, the in- 
stitution may be defended against all assault on the grounds that its 
heritage is so priceless, its age so venerable and its status so im- 
pregnable that nothing should be done to change its essential char- 
acteristics. This is reflected in the objection of the committee of the 
American Bar Association to recently proposed amendments to the 
bankruptcy act, that upon the present bankruptcy act, 
tSterling Professor of Law, Yale University. 
1. See Sturges, Credit Administration and Wage Earner Bankruptcies (1933) 
42 YALE L. J. 487; and see Nugent, Why Wage Earners Go Bankrupt (1931) 
24 AM. BK. ASSOC. JOUR. 9. 
2. See especially Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, United States Senate, 72d Cong., 1st Sess., Parts 1-4 inc., (Gov. 
Print. Off. 1932) on SEN. Doc. 3866 (the so-called Hastings Bill) introducing 
amendments to the Bankruptcy Act prepared and sponsored by the Department 
of Justice and recommended by the President. In this connection see Douglas, 
The Hastings Bill and Lessons Learned from the Bankruptcy Studies (1932) 
7 JOUR. NAT. ASSOC. REF. IN BANKRUPTCY 25. 
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"has been builded a great body of judicial decisions which must not be 
destroyed or abandoned in favor of theoretical or untested innovations." s 
Or, when economic and social disorders become acute, as at present, 
and bankruptcy is used more and more, and an increasing number 
of people fail to pay their debts, attempts to tighten-up on debtors are 
made. The institution becomes glorified in its efforts to counteract 
the tendency towards repudiation and non-payment of just obligations. 
The efforts to improve bankruptcy have been great in scope and 
intensity in recent years. The work done has been of high calibre 
and scholarship. Yet to a great extent it begs the major and dominant 
aspects of the problem. Bankruptcy per se has its problems of or- 
ganization and control as does any other judicial or administrative 
organization. But those problems are relatively insignificant as 
compared with conditions which give rise to the use of bankruptcy. 
In the medical profession great efforts and progress have been made 
in preventive as well as curative medicine. In the field of bankruptcy, 
however, the efforts have been otherwise. It would, of course, be 
ridiculous to suppose that bankruptcy experts could solve all the 
pressing problems of the present order. It is, however, to be regretted 
that when public funds and agencies of the United States government 
are mobilized under the direction of the President, the objective of 
the investigators should so completely disregard these pressing prob- 
lems and center so largely upon the traditional theme of internal 
efficiency.4 It seems, moreover, not too extravagant to hope that 
bankruptcy can be viewed against the background of the conditions 
with which it deals; that long-term planning for the many separate 
problems can be made; and that in light of that planning the role or 
function of bankruptcy in the total program be determined. Such 
planning leads directly to a consideration of division of control and 
responsibility between state and nation as respects these various 
problems and of allocating or dividing between the two the bank- 
ruptcy power as an incident of that control. Congress has but little 
direct control over the economic and social problems within the vari- 
ous states. Yet through the exercise of its bankruptcy power given 
it by the Constitution 5 it exerts an indirect but pervasive control 
over a wide variety of problems otherwise in the domain of the states. 
The bankruptcy power in general entails a determination of legis- 
lative policy on two problems: (1) the collection and equitable dis- 
3. American Bar Assoc., COMMITTEE AND OTHER REPORTS, 55th Annual Meet- 
ing, 1932, p. 89; and see the argument for substantive reform proposed by 
Professor James A. McLaughlin (1932) 11 CONG. DIG. 177, 178. 
4. See Strengthening of Procedure in The Judicial System, SEN. Doc. No. 
65, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (U. S. Gov. 1932). 
5. Art. I, §8 (4). 
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tribution of assets of a debtor among his various creditors; and (2) 
the release of a debtor from his legal obligation to pay his debts. 
More specifically the first problem requires a determination of when 
creditors may set the bankruptcy machinery in motion-how many 
creditors are necessary, the size of claims required, the nature of the 
claims, etc. Similarly, it requires a specification of assets of the 
debtor which may be reached, exemptions to which the debtor is 
entitled, priorities awarded to various creditors, and a host of details 
concerning the collection, liquidation, and distribution of assets. 
The second problem entails primarily a determination of the debts 
from which a debtor may be discharged, the conditions if any for a 
discharge, and the grounds upon which it may be refused. Ancillary 
to this problem is the specification of conditions under which the 
debtor himself may initiate the proceedings against the will of his 
creditors in order to obtain the benefit of a discharge. 
Congress has stated the policy on all these questions in the bank- 
ruptcy act now in force. And generally speaking, the enactment by 
Congress of such a comprehensive program is preemptive in the sense 
that it supersedes or suspends state enactments in conflict therewith.6 
It can readily be seen what a powerful instrument of control the 
bankruptcy power may become. It may or may not take cognizance 
of how the debtors became involved in debt and of the many differ- 
ences between types of debtors. Or again it may or may not dis- 
criminate between types of creditors and make the discharge easily 
available against one type and more restrictive as respects another 
type. But little discrimination is shown under the present act be- 
tween different types of debtors and creditors.7 Yet it is apparent 
that if a system were provided which took cognizance of the many 
economic and social problems antecedent to bankruptcy, it would be 
possible to integrate the bankruptcy power into programs of social 
planning in many fields and to effectuate different policies for dif- 
ferent problems depending upon their acuteness or importance in the 
several states. 
II 
It is the purpose of this essay to present in connection with two 
groups of wage earner bankrupts-one from New Jersey and the 
other from Boston 8-the variety and scope of the many economic and 
6. See Boese v. King, 108 U. S. 379 (1883); International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 
278 U. S. 261 (1928). 
7. See Douglas, Some Functional Aspects of Bankruptcy (1932) 41 YALE 
L. J. 329. 
8. The New Jersey cases were those filing bankruptcy petitions from the 
latter part of 1929 to the summer of 1930; the Boston cases, from the latter 
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social problems antecedent to these bankruptcies and to show the 
desirability of relinquishing or leaving to the states the bankruptcy 
part of 1930 to the summer of 1931. All of the Boston cases and about half of 
the New Jersey cases were studied by a personal interview followed or preceded 
by interviews with or letters from creditors and employers. The New Jersey 
cases represent about half of the wage earner bankruptcies in the district of 
New Jersey for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1930; the Boston cases about one- 
fourth of the wage earner bankruptcies in the district of Massachusetts for 
the fiscal year ended June 30, 1931. The study in New Jersey took cases from 
all parts of the District of New Jersey-rural as well as urban. The study in 
Massachusetts took cases arising only in the metropolitan area of Boston, i. e., 
the counties of Suffolk, Norfolk, and Middlesex. 
The New Jersey study was carried on with the generous supervision and 
collaboration of Hon. William Clark of the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey. The Boston study was made possible only because of 
the whole-hearted cooperation on the part of Hon. Arthur Black, Hon. B. 
Loring Young, and Hon. Charles C. Cabot-referees in bankruptcy in Boston. 
Both the New Jersey and Boston studies were conducted jointly by the De- 
partment of Commerce, the Yale Law School, and the Institute of Human 
relations of Yale University. Dr. W. C. Plummer of the Wharton School of 
Commerce represented the Department of Commerce in the New Jersey study; 
Mr. Victor Sadd in the Boston study. A report on the New Jersey business and 
wage earner bankrupts has been made by Dr. Plummer. See Causes of Busi- 
ness Failures and Bankruptcies of Individuals in New Jersey in 1929-30, 
DOMESTIC COMMERCE SERIES NO. 54, Publication of the Department of Commerce 
(Gov. Print. Off. 1931). A report on the Boston business cases has been made 
by Victor Sadd and Robert T. Williams. See Causes of Commercial Bankrupt- 
cies, DOMESTIC COMMERCE SERIES No. 69, Publication of the Department of 
Commerce (Gov. Print. Off. 1932). A report by the Department of Commerce 
on the Boston wage earners is forthcoming. 
Most but not all of the wage earner cases discussed herein are included in 
the foregoing reports. 
By occupation these wage earners were distributed as follows: 
Occupations 
Boston New Jersey 
Skilled 88 31 
Unskilled 26 6 
Sales 81 22 
Office 26 7 
Public 22 9 
Professional 8 15 
Executive 31 3 
Housewife 4 8 
None 1 6 
Unknown 14 
Total 301 107 
The Attorney General's Report lists the professional group separately. They 
have been added here partly for convenience due to the small size of the group 
and largely because all but a very few were in fact on salaries. Housewives 
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power over such cases. In such a way basic differences in types of 
problems can be recognized by the several states and the bankruptcy 
power can be exercised so as better to effectuate any state program of 
control over a particular problem. 
Determination of causes of bankruptcy is extremely hazardous. 
Post mortems in this field are none too successful. Cause and effect 
curiously intermingle. Cause here, as in other situations such as 
automobile accidents, would appear differently to different observers. 
Further, the train of events during the months preceding bank- 
ruptcy is difficult to reconstruct. In most cases, however, a dominant 
characteristic does appear. These characteristics are many and 
varied. Only general or gross classifications will be made here. 
But from them will emerge some picture of the wide variety of social 
and economic problems with which bankruptcy deals. Against the 
immobility of the institution of bankruptcy and its uniformity may 
be set the mobility and lack of uniformity of the situations with 
respect to which it functions. And when it is remembered that 
commercial, industrial, and social problems vary much from state 
to state and from region to region, the conviction grows that this 
national and uniform system of bankruptcy cannot be made sufficiently 
flexible to give expression to policies respecting so many varied 
problems. 
have also been added for the same reasons; and the "none" group because of 
the small size. Housewives, "none," and unknown probably appear under the 
heading "Other classes" in the reports of the Attorney General. At least from 
our study of classifications of bankrupts made in another connection that was 
true. See Strengthening of Procedure in The Judicial System, supra note 4, 
at 157, setting forth the results of our break down of "Other classes." 
Our classification "Public" includes policemen, firemen, mail carriers, sheriffs, 
and higher governmental employees; "Executive" includes department heads 
and other junior, as well as senior, executives. 
On nationality the following is the classification of the Boston bankrupts, 
considering a person an American if both he and his father were born in the 
United States and as an alien if he or his father were born in a foreign country: 
American, 135; Russian, 33; Canadian, 30; Scotch, 19; Irish, 18; German, 15; 
English, 13; Italian, 13; Others, 29. 
The age distribution of the Boston bankrupts was: 




60 and over 16 
Total 294 
281 of the Boston bankrupts were males; 20, females. 
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Consumption Credit 
Personal bankruptcies are often attributed in popular thought to 
too much consumption credit. The element of "too much" is usually 
present. But whether it is always or normally consumption credit 
may be wondered. Consumption credit and its incidence in bank- 
ruptcy are difficult if not impossible to measure. Using, however, as 
the measuring rod of consumption credit, amounts owed to loan 
companies, on instalment purchases, and on retail open accounts the 
following observations may be made. 
Ninety-six of the Boston group owed loan companies. The average 
amount owed was $651, as against the average of all liabilities in 
these cases of $6474. Forty-five of the New Jersey group owed such 
companies, the average amount owed being $1466 as against the 
average of all liabilities in those cases of $19460. The loans were 
made for many different reasons-to pay doctors, to buy automobiles, 
to make payments on a home, to pay tuition in a night school, to buy 
clothes, etc. Nor was any one purpose dominant, or more prevalent 
than another. 
In the 96 Boston cases there were 54 different loan companies and 
20 credit unions with claims. Eighteen of these loan companies 
were unlicensed and operating outside the law which makes illegal 
interest in excess of 31/2% per month on unpaid balances of loans of 
$300 or less. Twenty-five of the 96 bankrupts owed these 18 un- 
licensed companies. 
Pyramiding of loans was not conspicuous as seen from the follow- 
ing table: 
Number of Loan Companies 
Boston New Jersey 
1 62 ............... ... 23 
2 14 .................... 7 
3 12 ... ................ 3 
4 3 ............ ....... 5 
5 3 .................... 3 
6 1 . .................. 3 
7 1 .................... 0 
17 0 .................... 1 
96 45 
Average 1.7 Average 2.6 
As can be seen almost two-thirds in Boston and over one-half in 
New Jersey owed but one loan company. Instances of many loan 
companies, so prevalent in other studies,9 are inconspicuous in the 
Boston cases and not predominant in the New Jersey ones. 
9. See e. g., Fortas, Wage Assignments in Chicago-State Street Furniture 
Co. v. Armour & Co., (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 526, passim. 
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There were only 11 of the Boston cases and 5 of the New Jersey 
cases where the amount owed loan companies was 50% or more of 
all liabilities. In 7 of the 11 Boston cases and in two of the New 
Jersey cases the indebtedness to loan companies constituted all or 
practically all of the total liabilities. 
There were 90 of the Boston group who owed balances on instal- 
ment purchases. The average balance owed was $532 as compared 
with the average of all liabilities in those cases of $18,233. The 
range of instalment debts was from $11 to $8500. The purchases 
usually were clothes, furniture, and automobiles. But in only 19 
of the group of 90 were such debts 50 % or more of the total liabilities. 
And in but 3 of the 19 were those debts all or practically all of the 
liabilities. There were only 5 cases in the New Jersey group owing 
debts on instalment accounts. These debts were so small as compared 
with the total liabilities that they have been eliminated here from 
further consideration. 
Of the Boston cases 214 owed retailers, the average amount owed 
being $466 as against an average of total liabilities in those cases of 
$8,713. In only 34 of those cases were retail debts 50% or more of the 
total liabilities and in only 13 did they constitute all or practically all 
of the liabilities. 
Combinations of debts owed loan companies and retailers on open 
and instalment accounts will be considered later in respect to certain 
types of cases. To recapitulate here, the relation of these debts (1) 
to total liabilities in those cases and (2) to total liabilities in all the 
cases might be summarized as follows for the Boston cases: 
% Liab. in % Liab. in 
No. Cases Amount These Cases All Cases 
Loan Companies 96 $62,496 10% 1.5% 
Instalment 90 47,880 2.8 1.1 
Retail 214 99,830 5.3 2.8 
Total 400 $210,206 18.1% 5.4% 
And the number of cases in the Boston group where the amount 
owed loan companies, or retailers on open or instalment account was 
50% or more of all liabilities in these cases may be summarized as 
follows: 
50% or more All or practically all 
Loan Companies 11 7 
Instalment 19 3 
Retail 34 13 
Total 64 23 
If consumption credit is measured in terms of amounts owed loan 
companies and retail stores on instalment and open account, its in- 
cidence in these bankruptcy cases is not great, certainly as respects 
the total of all cases. It seems obvious that these bankrupts are not 
dominantly composed of victims of moneylenders or of those who have 
overindulged in instalment or other retail credit. The incidence of 
consumption credit in particular cases will be examined more in detail 
hereafter. In general it may be concluded that consumption credit 
is cumulative rather than direct in its effect on these bankruptcies. 
We know, however, that in some districts the relationship between 
consumption credit and bankruptcy is intimate.10 Complexion and 
practices of loan companies vary much from state to state and even 
within states. Retail credit practices are by no means standardized. 
And controls by creditors over the flow of credit are also variable. 
Industrial and social conditions contribute to the resultant non- 
uniformity in quality and quantity of consumption credit. Some 
states are active in their control over these problems; some are not. 
Bankruptcy of course increases in importance as the problems of 
consumpton credit become more acute. As state regulation of these 
businesses and their practices advances it seems essential that the 
possibilities of bankruptcy as an integral part of that control be 
evaluated. In terms of social planning it seems essential that the 
bankruptcy power be vested in the hands of those who otherwise 
control these agencies of consumption credit. That would entail a 
surrender of the power by Congress and its return to the states. 
Thereupon it could be employed by the states as an integral part of 
their multiple program of control over such businesses. 
Excessive Expenditures Without Mitigating Circumstances 
Expenditures in relation to income are by no means a criterion 
for classifying bankrupts. Income may have been reduced so low 
that expenditures for necessities of life may appear to be extrava- 
gant. Housing conditions may warrant and justify the payment of 
a disproportionate amount of income for rent. Sacrifices of some 
items may permit indulgence in luxuries; and so on. In making this 
classification regard has been had for minimum standards of living, 
for income, and for dependents; and in light of those, expenditures 
have been judged. But even so, some cases were marginal or 
doubtful. Taking only those cases reasonably free from doubt, there 
are 32 from the Boston group and 12 from the New Jersey group 
where, without any mitigating circumstances, expenditures preceding 
10. See Nugent, Consumer Credit and Social Agencies (1931) 42 U. S. IN- 
VESTOR 14, 16, describing conditions in Kentucky. 
598 YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42 
WAGE EARNER BANKRUPTCIES 
bankruptcy seemed clearly excessive, not including the cases of home 
building and buying discussed hereafter. 
Most of these were not cases of fraud in the usual meaning of 
the term. Not over six were cases involving an element of intent 
to deceive and to obtain goods without paying for them. The bal- 
ance were cases of irresponsibility and excessive optimism as to the 
early arrival of prosperity. Ten were cases of overindulgence in 
expensive cars. The others were splurges in high class apartments, 
jewelry, fur coats, furniture, radios and similar articles. Six were 
cases of extravagant wives from whom the debtor had been sep- 
arated or divorced, the debts being incurred at the time of the 
domestic trouble. 
There were 17 others from Boston which were marginal or doubt- 
ful cases. Making an ex post facto judgment it was impossible to 
weigh certain possibly mitigating circumstances such as medical 
costs, reduction of salary, an automobile accident, an accommodation 
note, an increase in number of dependents, etc. These 17 were not 
cases of fraud. They were irresponsibility plus. The intervention of 
illness and medical costs was present in 9 of them; unemployment 
or reduction of income in 5; and automobile accident judgments in 
3. Conservatively, then, 32 of the Boston cases would be classified 
here; liberally, 49. 
In the 49 Boston cases the average of liabilities was $2,460, the 
range being from $400 to $8,500. The New Jersey cases were of 
about the same complexion and owed about the same amounts. 
Of the Boston cases, consumption credit (as measured by debts 
to loan companies and to retailers on open and instalment account) 
is more conspicuous in this group than in any other. $7,919 was 
owed to loan companies, $9,268 on instalment purchases, and $32,187 
to retailers on open account. The total of $49,374 was 41% of all 
the liabilities in those cases. Or, out of the total of debts owed loan 
companies in all cases 12% was owed by the cases of this group, 
19% in cases of instalment debts; and 31% in cases of retail debts 
on open account. 
There were, of course, cases of abuse of consumption credit in 
this group. In 28 of the 49 Boston cases such debts were 50% or 
more of the total liabilities; and in 12 cases these debts constituted 
all or practically all of the liabilities. And while 7 of the 12 New 
Jersey cases owed loan companies, only one owed any substantial 
amount and in that case such debt constituted all of the liabilities. 
Abuse of consumption credit then was hardly a dominant char- 
acteristic of the cases of either group. In other words there are 
many ways of being extravagant besides indulging in small loans, 
instalment purchases, and ordinary retail credit. Yet from these 
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cases it may be wondered just how intimate the relationship between 
abuse of consumption credit and bankruptcy is. 
Case 0880, a middle aged skilled workman, up to three years ago 
had been making around $5,000 a year. Since then his earnings 
had dropped to around $2,000 due to curtailment of production 
and business depression. His debts were scheduled at $1,600 and 
his assets as $8 in cash. $1,000 was owed retailers and $300 to 
the landlord. His rent was $900 a year-almost half of his income. 
Following reduction in salary, he and his wife did not readjust 
their scale of living. Unknown to the bankrupt his wife had opened 
up new accounts in Boston department stores during the last year. 
Likewise she purchased an automobile for $350 on instalment. The 
bankrupt blamed not his wife but the "loose credit practices" of 
Boston department stores. 
Salesman 0863, aged 51, had assets of $36 and liabilities of $8,500. 
His earnings had been as high as $7,500 but during the last year 
had dropped to $3,500. His first wife divorced him the year pre- 
vious and was granted $3,000 a year alimony. He also acquired 
$1,000 of her debts. But the second wife was more expensive. He 
purchased a $200 car for his second honeymoon. She became ill 
and he spent $450 on her for doctor's bills. In addition he bor- 
rowed $500; charged $2,300 for flowers, fur coats, groceries; $400 
for hotels; $225 for rent; $439 for the lawyers who defended his 
case. There also were earlier loans of $4,000. At the time of the 
examination the second wife was confined in a psychiatric ward 
in a famous hospital and salesman 0863 was complaining of a 
"nervous ailment." Through all this time, however, he had paid 
regularly the $300 annual premiums on his life insurance. 
Case 0389 had been with his present employer twenty years and 
had worked up to a position of foreman in the factory. He earned 
$1,500 a year and his employment was full time. He had always 
been able to make ends meet and had a good record of honesty and 
dependability. He had a wife and five children and three years 
earlier had purchased a house on mortgage for $3,500, the carrying 
charges being about $450 a year. At the same time he purchased 
on instalment an automobile for $500. Shortly thereafter his 
daughter aged 14 married a boy aged 17. The boy had no employ- 
ment or means of support. Accordingly he and his wife moved in 
with the bankrupt who paid all the expenses. The necessity of sup- 
porting eight people proved an enormous burden. Another daughter 
grew up and she, her married sister and the bankrupt's wife began 
to increase the standard of living. Their bills for cold creams, 
powders and perfumes were $15 a month. They purchased $1,200 
of furniture, radio, and clothes on instalment. $700 was borrowed 
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from loan companies to meet instalments on the auto and on the 
house and for additional luxuries. The unpaid grocery bill mounted 
to $450. The payments on the house were defaulted and the mortgage 
was foreclosed. The car was repossessed. The demands of the eight 
dependents for luxury and entertainment continued. The total lia- 
bilities were $2,700, almost two years' salary of the bankrupt. His 
wages were attached and to keep his job he filed the voluntary 
petition. 
Rent 
Rent as an item of expenditure should be considered perhaps in 
connection with the foregoing group of cases. From a study made 
in 1918 by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United States 
Department of Labor of the cost of living in 92 industrial centers, 
including Boston,1l the average family of five with income below 
$2,100 a year spent between 13% and 15% of the annual income 
for rent. When the income was in excess of $2,100, the amount 
spent for rent was between 10% and 12%. 
A study made in 1930 of the standard of living of Ford employees 
in Detroit with an average income of $1,700 and families of 4.5 
persons 12 showed the amount spent for rent about 23%o of income.13 
And from a study made in Boston in 1928 of the cost of living of 
federal employees 14 with an average family of 4.115 persons and 
earning not over $2,500 a year the average amount paid for rent 
each year was $500. The percentage of annual income paid for rent 
probably ranged from 33% or slightly more in the lower income 
brackets to around 20% in the higher income brackets. 
Compared with these studies is the estimate made in 1927, that 
$30 a month was necessary for "the average minimum expenditure 
for rent in Boston for the family of four living on an American 
standard." 16 
A detailed analysis of the Boston bankrupts in this connection 
will not be set forth here. But the following summary is interest- 
ing as showing the importance of the rent item, certainly in the 
11. Cost of Living in the United States, Bull. No. 357, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, U. S. Dept. of Labor (1924). 
12. Standard of Living of Employees of Ford Motor Co. in Detroit (1930) 30 MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 1209 et seq. 
13. 22.6%X of the average yearly expense. The average deficit for all fam- ilies was $7.96. 
14. Cost of Living of Federal Employees in Five Cities (1929) 29 MONTHLY LABOR REVIEW 315 et seq. The other cities were Baltimore, Chicago, New Or- 
leans, and New York City. 
15. Not including boarders and lodgers. 
16. The Cost of Living in Twelve Industrial Cities, Natural Industrial Con- 
ference Board (1928) at 21. 
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lower income groups. It should be noted, however, that the precise 
extent to which drastic reductions in income, especially in the lower 
income groups, have resulted in disproportionate expenditures for 
rent cannot be computed. 
Income No. of Cases Average % Rent of Income 
$1,000 or less 38 92 % 
$1,500 and over $1,000 56 34.9 
$2,000 and over $1,500 50 27.5 
$2,500 and over $2,000 22 22.9 
$3,000 and over $2,500 9 27.5 
Over $3,000 11 16.1 
Total Cases 186 
Taking arbitrarily 33% and 20% as measurements of reasonable- 
ness of rent, the following distribution of cases above and below 
those standards appears: 
Income Over 33% 33% or less Over 20% 20% or less 
$1,000 or less 37 1 38 0 
$1,500 and over $1,000 28 28 47 9 
$2,000 and over $1,500 12 38 36 14 
$2,500 and over $2,000 0 22 16 6 
$3,000 and over $2,500 3 6 6 3 
Over $3,000 0 11 3 8 
80 106 146 40 
Liability for rent was not conspicuous, however, in the Boston 
bankruptcies. There were 78 (26%) who had such debts among 
their liabilities. These owed on the average $421, the range being 
from $20 to $1,500. These debts were negligible as respects the 
total liabilities in those cases and almost infinitesimal in the total 
liabilities of all cases. In only 9 cases was the rent liability 50% 
or more of the total liabilities, and in only 1 case did it amount to 
all or practically all of the liabilities. 
Here are then a considerable group of cases reflecting through the 
medium of rent a variety of situations. It is not apparent that ex- 
travagant living is necessarily proved. Long term leases signed in 
times of prosperity take their toll in periods of depression. Hous- 
ing conditions, especially for lower income groups, vary much from 
city to city and state to state. Social standards likewise vary and 
in any one place are relative. In dealing with the item of rent then 
in bankruptcy, as well as in budgets, we are dealing with an indi- 
cator that at times points to cause and at times to effect. Like bank- 
ruptcy it is a mirror reflecting many different social and economic 
conditions. 
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Own Your Home 
Seventy-six of the Boston bankrupts had made attempts at buy- 
ing or building their own home. In all but three of these cases the 
mortgage had been forclosed. Sixteen had made the purchase in 
their wives' names. The average term of the venture was a little 
over a year. Payments of interest and amortization of principal 
were on the whole out of all proportion to the annual income. The 
following table shows that proportion. The extent to which drastic 
reductions in income, especially in the lower income groups, have 
resulted in disproportionate expenditures cannot be accurately com- 
puted. 
Average % 
Annual Income No. of Cases Payments of Income 
$1,000 or less 16 176.7%o 
$1,500 and over $1,000 8 71.9 
$2,000 and over $1,500 15 40.0 
$2,500 and over $2,000 9 40.7 
Over $2,500 10 23.0 
Total - 58 
These ill advised attempts at home owning accounted for 40 of 
the Boston bankruptcies. In many others it contributed to the load 
of debts. But those have been eliminated here. These 40 are cases 
where either the intervention of subsequent disasters such as unem- 
ployment, sickness, etc. merely accelerated the end of a doomed 
venture; or where such intervening factors were not present. One 
example of the former is the purchase of a house calling for yearly 
payments of $1,000 a year for ten years. The purchaser at the 
time was making $3,100 a year and had eleven people totally de- 
pendent on him. The same year his salary was reduced to $2,250; 
he defaulted in his payments; the mortgage was foreclosed and a 
deficiency judgment of $3,000 was entered against him. Another 
was the purchase of a home requiring payments of $1,400 a year. 
The purchaser's annual salary was $2,100 and he had five depend- 
ents. He only paid $600 when foreclosure was had. Meanwhile his 
salary had decreased through lay-offs to $1,600 a year. An example 
of the latter was the purchase of a home for $6,400 with annual 
payments of $800 by a man earning $2,200 a year and having four 
dependents. The house was in such poor condition that it was neces- 
sary to borrow $2,000 to make it livable. The mortgage was fore- 
closed and the total liabilities were the $2,000 borrowed. 
In all but four of the cases deficiency judgments had been entered. 
In the four the property had been foreclosed and the amount owing 
was for money borrowed either to repair the house or to pay taxes 
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and meet payments under the mortgage. In one case $4,500 had 
been borrowed from five different loan companies. 
In all of the 40 cases the deficiency judgment or amount borrowed 
to finance the house constituted all or practically all of the liabilities. 
The average amount owed was $7,871, the range being from $546 
to $50,000. 
To these 40 may be added 11 from the New Jersey group, the 
average here owed being $7,294, the range being $1,000 to $20,000. 
Financing of home building or buying is essentially a local prob- 
lem in which savings banks, commercial banks, building and loan 
associations, etc., all play a part. The intrusion of the Federal gov- 
ernment in this field in recent years can hardly be taken as indica- 
tive of a preemptive program on its part. Home building and 
buying, as well as housing, seems so articulated with municipal 
affairs that it will remain essentially a local problem,17 inseparable 
from the problem of taxation and the methods of promotion, ap- 
praisal, financing, and collection. If the above data are representa- 
tive, the relationship between home building and bankruptcy is by 
no means inconsiderable. Bankruptcy looms as an effective agency 
for control of these problems. The possibilities of its use as such 
have never been exploited or tried. Nor can they be, so long as the 
power rests in Congress whose opportunity for long term planning 
and intimate control in this field is exceedingly indirect. A return 
of the bankruptcy power to the states makes possible a utilization 
of this power in any program for social planning in this field. The 
futility of uniformity is avoided. The adaptation of the power to 
changing and variable conditions from state to state becomes pos- 
sible. 
Speculation and Gambling 
Fifteen of the Boston bankrupts went into bankruptcy solely as 
a result of speculation in realty. Five of these were aftermaths of 
the collapse of the spectacular Florida boom. In the fourteen cases 
there were practically no claims among the liabilities except those 
arising out of the speculation. Those claims ranged from $988 to 
$177,000, averaging $27,893. 
Mechanic 0881 making $3,000 a year and having steady employ- 
ment acquired eight houses during the last three years. His wife 
managed them. A year ago she died. He did not have the time to 
attend to them. He began to lose tenants. Then came the real estate 
slump. All mortgages on the eight properties were foreclosed and 
17. See Reports of The President's Conference On Home Building and Home 
Ownership, vols. II, IV, and XI (Wash. D. C. 1932). 
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deficiency judgments of $50,000 entered against him. These con- 
stituted all of his liabilities. His assets were zero. 
Five of the New Jersey bankruptcies were the result of real 
estate speculation. The liabilities ranged from $2,000 to $25,000. 
Seven others from Boston came into bankruptcy as a result of 
stock speculations; and five more as a result of gambling with cards, 
dice and lottery tickets. The average debt was $8,755. A review 
of many of these cases has been given elsewhere.18 The following 
are somewhat typical. 
Case 0696 was a laborer earning $35 a week. His wife received 
$15 a week for stenographic services. They purchased a home for 
$5,700, the carrying charges being about $75 a month. They secured 
access to a source of market "tips." They were wiped out by the 
stock market crash, losing about $5,000. They struggled along for 
a while. On a Saturday they appeared at a retail house and pur- 
chased $75 of goods on credit. On Monday next the petition was 
filed. In spite of the heavy losses and low income the debts exceeded 
the assets by less than $2,000, most of which was owed commercial 
houses. 
Case 0255 was a laundress making $33 a week. She had accu- 
mulated over a period of years $5,000 in savings. This was used 
in the fall of 1928 to purchase two well known stocks on margin. 
In the stock market crash the stocks dropped about forty points each, 
wiping her out and leaving a balance of $600 due the broker. Suit 
was brought for that sum. That claim represented all of her lia- 
bilities. Her assets were zero. 
Of the New Jersey cases five came under this head. 
Accommodation Indorsements 
Debts on accommodation indorsements of notes were present 'in 52 of the salaried group of Boston bankrupts. The average debt 
on indorsements was $16,292, the range being from $45 to $400,000. The average of all liabilities in those cases was $24,473. Eight cases involved indorsements of notes to loan companies for friends and 
relatives. Eleven were indorsements in connection with a previous 
unsuccessful business venture of a relative or of a corporation with 
which the wage earner had been associated. One was the indorse- 
ment by a wife of $53,000 of her husband's notes given in a number of 
speculative real estate transactions. 
In over half (29) of the cases the debts on the indorsements con- 
stituted 50% or more of the total liabilities. In 15 such liability 
was all or practically all of the total indebtedness. In those cases 
18. Douglas op. cit. supra note 7, at 343. 
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the debts for indorsements ranged from $250 to $400,000. In the 
29 cases it is clear that the motivation for bankruptcy was the ac- 
commodation liability. In the remaining 23, bankruptcy might well 
have followed even though no such liability was present. It is true 
that most of the group had a different attitude towards these obli- 
gations than towards other types of creditors. Yet a conservative 
estimate is that in only 29 cases were accommodation indorsements 
the sole factor in the bankruptcies. 
To these might be added the case of an office employee earning 
$2,100 who acted as a "straw man" 19 in a building contract. Out 
of that venture arose debts of $248,122 which he went into bank- 
ruptcy to have discharged. 
Accommodation indorsements were even more conspicuous in the 
New Jersey cases, 35 out of the 107 having such debts. The average 
debt on indorsements was $48,421 as against the average of all 
liabilities of $49,870. The range of indorsement debts was from 
$800 to $300,000. In five of the cases the indorsements were on 
notes of loan companies. The balance were in connection with a 
previous unsuccessful business venture of a friend or relative or of 
a corporation with which the bankrupt had been associated. In 31 
of the cases the liability on indorsements was 50% or more of the 
total liabilities; and in fact constituted all or practically all of the 
liabilities. In every case the pressure of the creditor who held the 
indorsement was the direct occasion for the filing of the bankruptcy 
petition. 
19. On "strawmen" see Ottman v. Nixon-Nirdlinger, 301 Pa. 234, 151 Atl. 
879 (1930); Rader v. Bernstein, 15 Pa. D. & C. 341 (1931); Dietz v. Girard 
Craftsman's Club of Philadelphia, 9 Pa. D. & C. 805 (1927); Squire v. William 
S. Drozda Realty Co., 288 S. W. 988 (Mo. App. 1926). In the Ottman case a 
lessor of realty sued to recover overdue instalments of rent. The lessee had 
assigned the lease under seal to a strawman acting for defendants. The court 
reversed a judgment for defendants, holding they were undisclosed principals 
and liable on the basis of privity of estate. The dissenting judges said (p. 245): 
"The effort of the law should always be to keep pace with the customs of the 
people, and this is practically so in the realm of trade. Of recent years, the 
attempt has been made to make the buying, selling, and ownership of real 
estate as easy and uncomplicated as that of other classes of property; the 
right use of strawmen facilitates this commendable end, and has been sanctioned 
by us." 
In the Dietz case a corporation in order to make bonds legal investments for 
trust funds [PA. CONST. Art. 3, § 22] conveyed its property to a strawman 
who executed mortgages on the property and issued bonds thereunder. There- 
upon he reconveyed the property to the corporation "subject to" the mortgages. 
Subsequently the mortgages were foreclosed and a receiver was appointed for 
the corporation. The third mortgagee then asserted a claim against the assets 
of the corporations. The claim was disallowed. 
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Case 0706 was sixty years old, rheumatic and an invalid, supported 
by his wife who ran a small candy shop and had $50 income per 
month from a house she owned. He became accommodation co- 
maker for a friend on a note for $375. This was all of his liabili- 
ties. He had been ordered by the Poor Debtor Court to pay $2.00 
a week and was in contempt. 
One employer in Boston allowed his employees two trusteeships 
of wages each year and no more. They were warned that if more 
than that number were filed, discharge might follow. Case 0661 
had become accommodation co-maker or indorser on notes for 
friends to six different loan companies on eight different loans 
totalling $760. His total liabilities were only $1,000 including the 
above. None of these loans were for his use. The bankrupt was 
earning $1,800 a year and had regular employment. He was frugal 
and industrious and lived within his means, supporting a wife and 
one son. There was no other occasion for his bankruptcy. During the 
last year defaults were made on the notes and he made several 
payments. To avoid pressure of creditors and violation of the rule 
of his employer he filed his petition. 
Automobile Accident Judgments 
Five of the Boston cases came into bankruptcy as a consequence of 
automobile accident judgments. In addition to these five were six 
others who had among their liabilities judgments for such claims. 
Such judgments, however, were much more conspicuous among the New Jersey group, being present in 22 of the cases. In fifteen of 
those cases the judgment was over 75% of all the liabilities. The 
judgments covered property damage, personal injuries, and death.20 
Automobile accident judgments are dischargeable in bankruptcy.21 The function of bankruptcy in that regard has been discussed else- 
where.22 The extent to which Congress should go in relieving judg- 
ment debtors from such liabilities is at best arguable. The relevancy 
of the data here is not so much to the function of the discharge and the social policies involved in relieving or not relieving debtors from 
such judgments as to the decidedly local nature of the problem of 
regulation of the automobile. Massachusetts since January 1, 1927 has had a compulsory automobile insurance statute.23 New Jersey has none. The whole problem of socializing the losses resulting 
20. For a more detailed discussion of these cases see Douglas, op. cit. supra note 7, at 340. 
21. See cases cited infra note 50. 
22. See Douglas, op. cit. supra note 7. 
23. MASS. CUM. STAT. (1927) c. 90, §§ 34 a et seq. 
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from such accidents is far advanced in thought and discussion.24 
The next decade will doubtless see much activity on the part of states 
to solve the problem. Yet judged from the past 25 such legislation is 
not likely to be uniform in either scope or detail. Though in theory 
the problem is the same from state to state, actually conditions vary 
much, at least in intensity. 
In other words the problem of the automobile accident judgment 
may well continue to vary much from state to state because of lack 
of uniformity both of conditions and of legislation. Congress, with- 
out power over the automobile, exerts a power over accident judg- 
ments through bankruptcy. And the incidence of the exercise of 
that power is great, as can be seen from the New Jersey and Boston 
cases. The problem of state as against federal control in this field 
is certainly not unique and probably no more acute than in many 
other fields. Yet the recognition of the problem as one between state 
and nation has great advantages. For then the problem tends to be 
conceived of not in terms of bankruptcy but of automobile accident 
judgments. When so considered it calls clearly for a return of the 
bankruptcy power to the states. 
Medical Costs and Illness 
Sickness and doctors' bills, accidents and hospital charges, illness 
and unemployment played a major role in the Boston and New Jersey 
bankruptcies. 
From studies made by The Committee on The Costs of Medical 
Care 26 it appears that the relationship between annual charges for 
24. See Report by the Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile 
Accidents to the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sci- 
ences (1932). 
25. Cf. e.g., the Massachusetts statute, supra note 23, and the Connecticut 
statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) c. 82, § 1609, providing that the commissioner 
of motor vehicles may require proof of financial responsibility from a person 
who while operating a motor vehicle causes property damage to at least $50 
,or injures any person. Failure to provide such proof may result in suspension 
*or revocation of the license and registration. 
26. Publication No. 27, THE COST OF MEDICAL CARE, The Economic Aspects 
of the Prevention and Care of Illness, c. XVII. 
For comparsion with the Boston figures set forth subsequently in the text 
the following data on 25 of the New Jersey cases are relevant: 
Aver. Annual Aver. % of 
Income No. Cases Charges Annual Income 
Under $1200 1 $1013 153 % 
$1200-$2000 3 208 12 
$2000-$3000 5 522 20.5 
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medical care and income of families in communities of 100,000 and 
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If the figures from the Committee are taken as a norm, the ex- 
penditures by the bankrupt group for medical care are highly 
excessive especially in the lower three income groups-the charges 
being four times normal in the lowest income group; three times 
normal in the second; and about three times normal in the third. 
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About 64% of the cases, then, had expenditures for medical care 
in excess of the average figure supplied by the Committee. 
In 53 of the Boston cases they created such a burden of debt that 
under the pressure of creditors bankruptcy seemed the only way 
out. In many cases sickness and doctors' bills had a cumulative effect 
in adding to the burden of debt. But those have not been included 
here. Also the mere fact that large doctors' bills were incurred has 
not resulted in classifying the cases in this category. Those expenses 
have been related to income and in turn to minimum costs of living. 
In each of them payment would have been impossible without re- 
ducing the families to an unbearable poverty level. 
In seventeen of the cases members of the family had received 
treatment at clinics and in three cases at veterans' hospitals. But 
these visits were usually after the crisis had passed and largely were 
for rather minor matters such as removal of warts from a son's hand. 
All of them showed a great insistence on obtaining their own doctor 
or specialist. 
In sixteen cases sickness and accidents caused such prolonged ab- 
sences from work as to make it impossible to pay accumulated debts. 
These absences ran from four months to four years. The afflictions 
were many and varied-heart, eyes, stomach, liver and blood pressure. 
In two cases there was a nervous breakdown resulting in unemploy- 
ment for several years and confinement in psychiatric wards in 
hospitals. Another was the case of a bootlegger whose still blew up 
and incapacitated him for several months. 
Deaths with their attendant funeral expenses and preliminary 
medical expenses accounted for seven cases. The balance were in- 
stances of illness of wives and children, some continuing over a long 
period of years, others ending in a major operation. 
The average of the liabilities was $1747, the range being from 
$221 to $8900. 
Consumption credit played not an unimportant role in the bank- 
ruptcies in this group. $5220 was owed to loan companies; $4613 on 
instalment accounts; and $15,152 to retailers on open account. The 
total of $24,985 was 27% of all the liabilities in those cases. Out of 
the total of debts owed loan companies in all cases 8%o was owed by 
the cases of this group; 9.6% in case of instalment debts; and 15% 
in case of debts to retailers on open account. 
In 16 of the cases the debts owed loan companies and retailers on 
open and instalment account were 50% or more of all the liabilities; 
and in 6 of the cases they were all or practically all of the liabilities. 
A number of the loans were made to pay doctors. Most of the retail 
debts were absolute necessities. 
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The husband of housewife 0459 had been ill and unable to work for 
two and one-half years. She had been able to find only part time 
employment during the last year, her earnings being $5 a month. 
She was in arrears $660 in rent. The balance of her $1000 liabilities 
were for necessities of life. In addition to her husband she sup- 
ported an aged father. 
Truck driver 0079 had rather steady employment earning $1500 a 
year. He had seven children, all totally dependent. He said it was 
impossible to meet the ordinary living expenses on less than his 
salary. There was no evidence of extravagance. His rent was only 
$150 a year. His total liabilities were $685 and his assets zero. He 
owed $80 back rent, $350 for furniture purchased on instalment and 
$255 for groceries and clothes. His bankruptcy was traceable to the 
sickness of his wife. She had a nervous breakdown two years ago 
and her medical expenses were $300 a year. He had moved six times 
the last year. This was due to his wife's "nervous spells" when she 
insisted she could not stay longer in a particular tenement. Creditors 
finally summoned him into the Poor Debtor Court and to escape 
citation for contempt he filed the petition. 
Travelling salesman 0126, 65 years old, had two dependents. He 
had been making about $3000 a year up to three years ago. At that 
time he became seriously ill with high blood pressure and had to quit 
the road. He was unable to work for a year and a half. Since then 
he had been working quite regularly in a shoe store for $35 a week. 
His bills were $1000, all incurred during the year and a half of his 
illness. All but $150 was owed retailers for necessities of life. These 
creditors had attached his wages and he was in danger of losing his 
job. 
Case 0695 had steady employment and made $2100 a year. He 
supported five children and a wife. He lived very modestly. But 
when a child became sick he went in heavily for specialists. He was 
not satisfied with one and called another, and so on. He had also 
consulted a free clinic in Boston but apparently was not satisfied with 
that. To pay the doctors, the landlord and grocers had to wait. On 
going into bankruptcy he owed one specialist $180, the landlord $120 
and the grocer $200. 
In contrast are the New Jersey cases. There only four bank- 
ruptcies resulted from illness or excessive medical costs. 
Unemployment-Reduction of Income 
The incidence of unemployment was considerable in the Boston 
bankruptcies. About half were employed less than full time during 
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the year preceding bankruptcy. About 5% (14) were unemployed 
during the entire year. The numbers are as follows: 
Employment 
Boston New Jersey 
Full time 150 87 
Over one-half but less than full 65 
One-half 24 
Less than one-half 19 
None 14 6 
Total 272 93 
The unemployment of most was due to general business conditions; 
of some to age, poor health, inefficiency, etc. Further, there were 
many employed full or part time whose salaries had been reduced. 
These factors alone are not significant unless related to costs of living. 
Accordingly, an analysis was made of the effect of unemployment or 
reduction of salaries on costs of living and in turn on bankruptcy. 
At best the results may be solely rough estimates but they approxi- 
mate the real situation existing. 
In 56 of the Boston cases bankruptcy was brought on by unem- 
ployment or reduction of salary. Classification of these cases is not 
without difficulty. Unemployment because of sickness has not been 
included. Nor have those cases been included where income was 
reduced but the standard of living was not scaled down accordingly, 
it being possible to make such adjustment without falling below 
minimum standards of subsistence. Only cases have been included 
where the reduction of income reduced the families to such a low 
poverty level of living as to make it impossible for them to meet the 
estimated minimum costs of living. 
Six of these had received aid from local charities, cities, and the 
state, usually in the form of coal, clothing and food but in one case 
in cash from the state aid compensation fund.27 
As a rule these 56 were cases where a struggle to pay had been 
made. The debts on the whole dated back from two to eight years. 
Bankruptcy was chosen as the way out to protect what income the 
debtors then had or which they soon hoped to get. There was a fear 
in the minds of these people either that what they needed for subsist- 
ence would be taken from them by garnishment or that their employ- 
ers-present or prospective-being irritated at trusteeships would 
fire them and employ less involved employees. 
In over half of the cases (32) the debts were under $1000. All 
but twelve of the remainder (24) were under $2000. The average of 
27. MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 1184. 
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the liabilities was $1987, the range being from $185 to $11,000. Con- 
sumption credit was not conspicuous in these cases. $1679 was owed 
to loan companies; $13,199 on instalment purchases; and $15,894 
to retailers on open account. The total of $30,772 was 27% of all the 
liabilities in those cases. Practically all of it was owed for necessities 
of life. Out of the total debts owed loan companies in all cases only 
2.6% was owed by the cases of this group; 27% in case of instal- 
ment debts; and 17 % in case of debts owed retailers on open account. 
In 18 of the cases the debts owed loan companies and retailers on 
open and instalment account were 50% or more of all the liabilities; 
and in 6 of the cases they were all or practically all of the liabilities. 
Of the New Jersey cases only 6 came into bankruptcy as a result 
of accumulation of debts during periods of unemployment. 
As an emergency measure the exercise by Congress of the bank- 
ruptcy power for aid and protection of unemployed debtors might 
well be justified if states had not acted and the need were pressing. But as unemployment is more and more recognized as a problem for 
long term planning by states, it seems highly desirable to have the 
bankruptcy power vested in the states so as to make possible its 
flexible use as a part of particular schemes for lessening the shock 
and socializing the risk of unemployment. 
Miscellaneous 
Twenty-four of the Boston cases hardly belong in any classification 
of wage earners or salaried people. These men had once been in 
business, had been unsuccessful and over a period of years had been 
attempting to pay the old business debts without success. These debts ranged from $50 to $50,000. The average debt was $12,030. The incentive and occasion for bankruptcy varied somewhat from case 
to case. And in a few, subsequent debts contributed to the pressure 
on the debtor. But in practically all of the cases, all of the liabilities 
were from the previous business. Of the New Jersey cases there were 11 directly related to a previous business. A study of these cases then would entail a study of the businesses which failed. This was 
not done. 
In the few remaining Boston cases a wide variety of claims and judgments were involved: one, for conversion; one, for assault and 
battery; one, for malicious prosecution; one, for a judgment of $1,340,000 for damages for negligence of the bankrupt as director 
of a corporation; two, judgments on the sale of goods contested by the bankrupt on the ground of fraud; one, a judgment for legal 
services rendered; six, liabilities on accommodation indorsements 
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coupled with other factors such as unemployment, illness, etc.; and 
five, domestic difficulties. 
Three of the domestic cases involved alimony which, though not 
dischargeable in bankruptcy,28 is provable to the extent that it is in 
arrears.29 The debts in these cases for the most part were obligations 
incurred by the wife, which the bankrupt felt under no moral obliga- 
tion to pay. In all but two of the cases the debts were so large and the 
income so small that it was clear the bankrupt could hardly have 
avoided bankruptcy. 
Collection Methods 
Collection methods are one of the most conspicuous examples of 
the variability of conditions from state to state which may well have 
an important bearing on the type of bankruptcy act needed for the 
protection both of creditors and debtors. They have been discussed 
elsewhere in this symposium.30 Little is known respecting their in- 
cidence in bankruptcy. The groups of salaried bankrupts from New 
Jersey and Boston, however, throw some light on the operation of 
various collection devices in those two states and, conversely, the 
functioning of bankruptcy to relieve the pressure exerted by creditors 
through them. The collection methods involved are body executions 
and supplementary process, attachment and garnishment, and wage 
assignments. 
By statute in Massachusetts a defendant in a civil action (except 
slander or libel) may be arrested on mesne process on affidavit of the 
plaintiff and proof to the satisfaction of the court that, inter alia, the 
defendant intends to leave the commonwealth; the defendant has no 
property in the commonwealth which can be reached and which is 
sufficient to satisfy any judgment; and an examination of the defend- 
ant will disclose property to be held as security for a judgment.3' 
After judgment the creditor may file an application for supple- 
mentary process. A summons is issued requiring the judgment debtor 
to appear and submit to an examination relative to his property and 
ability to pay. The court may dismiss the proceedings if on ex- 
amination of the debtor it finds he has no non-exempt property and 
28. In re Pyatt, 257 Fed. 362 (D. Nev. 1918); Bankruptcy Act, § 17. 
29. Heimberger v. Joseph, 55 F. (2d) 171 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931). 
30. See Sturges and Cooper, Credit Administration and Wage Earner Bank- 
ruptcies (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 487, 502 et seq. 
31. MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 224, §§ 1-13. Provisions for bail on mesne 
process are set forth in MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 226. See Paine v. Kelley, 
197 Mass. 22, 83 N. E. 8 (1907); Morton's Case, 196 Mass. 21, 81 N. E. 869 
(1907). As to arrest on execution in a civil action see MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) 
c. 224, § 6. 
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is unable to pay the judgment in full or by partial payments. Or on 
being satisfied of the debtor's ability to pay it may order payment in 
full or by instalments, after allowing the debtor out of his income a 
reasonable amount for the support of himself and his family. Failure 
to obey an order of court constitutes contempt punishable by a fine 
of not more than $20 or by imprisonment for not more than thirty 
days.32 These are the proceedings in the Poor Debtor Court dis- 
cussed in detail in an accompanying article.33 
In New Jersey the writ of capias ad satisfaciendum may, with 
certain specified exceptions, be issued without a judge's order, and as 
a matter of course.34 The exceptions are judgments founded upon 
contract, express or implied; but in such case the writ will issue in 
some instances as in bailable causes.35 Thus it has been held that in 
an action of tort the writ will issue as a matter of course as under 
the English practice at the time of the separation of the colonies and 
without violation of the constitutional provision 36 against imprison- 
ment for debt.37 
On the other hand the writ of capias ad respondendum in tort 
actions is restricted to actions founded on seduction, outrageous 
battery or mayhem; actions to recover damages for the misconduct 
or neglect of public officers; or in special causes for holding defendant 
to bail.38 In contract actions it is restricted in general to cases of 
32. MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 224, §§ 14 et seq. 
33. Nehemkis, The Boston Poor Debtor Court-A Study in Collection Pro- 
cedure (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 561. 
34. Kintzel v. Olsen, 73 Atl. 962 (N. J. L. 1909). For regulations of issu- 
ance of the writ in district courts see N. J. COMP. STAT. (1910) p. 2006; Mes- 
serer v. Vannerman, 63 N. J. L. 535, 42 Atl. 806 (1899). See generally HARRIS, 
PLEADING & PRACTICE IN NEw JERSEY (N. J. Law School Press, 1926) ch. XX, 
:§§ 648-651. 
35. N. J. COMP. STAT. (1910) pp. 4109-10. For cases where the writ was not 
allowed to issue, see Carroll v. Mickens, 145 Atl. 620 (N. J. L. 1929); Breithecker 
v. Dallas, 87 N. J. L. 362, 94 Atl. 307 (1915); Ex parte Clark, 20 N. J. L. 648 
(1846). On allowance see Wire v. Browning, 20 N. J. L. 364 (1845); Kipp v. 
Chamberlin, 20 N. J. L. 656 (1846). As to decrees in chancery see N. J. COMP. 
STAT. (1910) p. 427. 
36. Art. I, § 17: "No person shall be imprisoned for debt in any action, or 
on any judgment founded upon contract, unless in cases of fraud . . ." The 
,cases of fraud include not only instances of fraudulent creation of the debt but 
also subsequent attempts to defeat the creditor's recovery of it by the ordinary 
process of the law. Ex parte Clark, supra note 35. 
37. Kintzel v. Olsen, supra note 34. The court said: "It follows that, since 
substantially all actions might be begun by capias and a ca. sa. was authorized 
in every such case, the latter writ ordinarily would issue as matter of course." 
But see GILBERT, THE LAW OF EXECUTIONS (1763, pp. 58 et seq.; 3 BL. COMM. 
c. XIX; 2 Co. INST . xxiii (1681). 
38. N. J. COMP. STAT. (1910) p. 4068. 
On special cause to hold defendant for bail, see Hufty v. Wilson, 78 N. J. L. 
241, 74 Atl. 137 (1909); Hand v. Nolan, 136 Atl. 430 (N. J. L. 1923) where the 
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fraudulent concealment or conveyance of assets, or where the debt 
was fraudulently contracted.39 Thus an order to hold to bail was 
discharged in an action to recover damages as a result of an assault 
and battery committed by defendant's reckless driving of an auto- 
mobile.4° The court said: "To me it seems quite clear that in order 
to constitute an outrageous assault and battery, the act or acts com- 
plained of must be of a character akin to mayhem, and must be 
malicious." 41 
Of the 107 New Jersey bankrupts of the salaried class only two had 
been arrested on a capias, and this was a capias ad satisfaciendum 
issued after judgments arising out of automobile accidents. These 
judgments constituted practically all of the bankrupts' liabilities. In 
one other case the judgment creditor had threatened to obtain a 
ca. sa. and the petition was filed to prevent it. In no cases had a 
capias ad respondendum been issued. 
There were two cases in the Boston group where arrest on mesne 
process had been made, each to prevent the debtor leaving the state. 
And there were two where the debtor had been committed to jail for 
contempt for failure to make instalment payments to the judgment 
creditor as ordered by the Poor Debtor Court. One was committed 
for five days; one for seven. It so happened that neither was a case 
of fraud or questionable practices of the debtor. One debtor was 
reduced to poverty by unemployment; the other was ill and over- 
burdened by a load of debts, partly medical, accumulated during the 
illness. If any default under a court order was justified, these were. 
Clearer cases of misfortune cannot be imagined. It seems somewhat 
ironical that out of the debtors available for commitment these two 
should have been chosen. 
About a third of the 301 Boston bankrupts (106) had been sum- 
moned in the Poor Debtor Court. All but 37 of these had filed their 
petitions in bankruptcy immediately on service of the summons. In 
each of the 37 cases the court had made orders to pay. All but 3 
court said, "Special reasons ordinarily cited are non-residence of the defendant, 
or facts and circumstances from which it may be inferred that the defendant 
may not be in the jurisdiction to answer to a judgment when rendered." And 
it has been said that special cause must be shown even in cases of outrageous 
battery or mayhem. Jacobs v. Costanzo, 136 Atl. 807 (N. J. Misc. 1927). Contra: 
Keegan v. Carhart, 106 N. J. L. 30, 147 Atl. 841 (1929). See generally HARRIS, 
op. cit. supra, note 34, ch. VI. 
39. N. J. COMP. STAT. (1910) p. 4069. Cf. Leventon v. Davison, 102 N. J. L. 
144, 130 Atl. 632 (1925). For cases granting the order see Polhemus v. Melides, 
96 N. J. L. 105, 113 Atl. 593 (1921). 
40. Haglich v. Ceverlere, 105 N. J. L. 521, 146 Atl. 591 (1929). For other 
cases denying it, see Hand v. Nolan, supra note 38; Siris v. Bialy, 136 Atl. 431 
(N. J. L. 1927). 
41. Haglich v. Ceverlere, supra note 40, at 523, 524. 
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of these were orders to pay in instalments, running from $1 a week 
up. In each of the 37 cases a default had been made and therefore 
the debtors were in contempt. But a capias had been issued in but 
two cases and as noted above those two debtors had been com- 
mitted. In no case was a fine imposed. 
For the most part the effect of bankruptcy upon body executions 
is clear. By section 9 of the Bankruptcy Act it is provided that 
"A bankrupt shall be exempt from arrest upon civil process except in the 
following cases: (1) when issued from a court of bankruptcy for contempt 
or disobedience of its lawful orders; (2) when issued from a State court 
having jurisdiction, and served within such State, upon a debt or claim 
from which his discharge in bankruptcy would not be a release, and in 
such case he shall be exempt from such arrest when in attendance upon a 
court of bankruptcy or engaged in the performance of a duty imposed by 
this Act." 
Somewhat similar provisions are contained in General Order XXX.42 
It is generally held that pursuant to section 9 of the Bankruptcy 
Act and General Order XXX a person against whom body execution 
has issued by reason of a debt dischargeable 43 in bankruptcy may 
be released from imprisonment by writ of habeas corpus on filing of 
a voluntary petition in bankruptcy44 or at least on adjudication.45 
The Federal court in Massachusetts has so held.46 Likewise a stay 
may be had where the proceedings may result in the arrest or im- 
prisonment of the bankrupt.4 And where before and at the time 
of the adjudication the bankrupt was confined in New Jersey under 
a capias ad satisfaciendum at the instance of a creditor having a 
dischargeable debt, habeas corpus was granted.48 Such relief is 
42. See also General Order XII, giving the referee power to afford protec- 
tion against arrest; and § 11 of the Bankruptcy Act providing for stays. 
43. Contra as to debts not dischargeable; In re Marcus, 104 Fed. 331 (D. 
Mass. 1900), aff'd, 105 Fed. 907 (C. C. A. 1st, 1901); In re Pyatt, supra note 28. 
44. Ex parte Margiasso, 242 Fed. 990 (S. D. N. Y. 1917) (judgment for 
automobile accident). 
45. Bissing v. Turkington, 113 Conn. 737, 157 Atl. 226 (1931); People 
ex rel. Taranto v. Erlanger, 132 Fed. 883 (S. D. N. Y. 1904); United States v. 
Sheriff, 52 F. (2d) 903 (E. D. N. Y. 1931); In re Komar, 234 Fed. 378 (N. D. 
N. Y. 1916); In re Madigan, 254 Fed. 221 (S. D. N. Y. 1918); Turgeon v. 
Emery, 182 Fed. 1016 (D. Me. 1910). Contra: In re Claiborne, 109 Fed. 74 
(S. D. N. Y. 1901). 
46. Ex parte Harrison, 272 Fed. 543 (D. Mass. 1921) (voluntary petition 
and immediate adjudication). Under the bankruptcy act of 1867 see Morse 
v. Dayton, 125 Mass. 47 (1878); Stockwell v. Silloway, 100 Mass. 287 (1868); 
Everett v. Henderson, 150 Mass. 411, 23 N. E. 318 (1890). 
47. In re Grist, 1 Am. Bank. Rep. 89 (1898). 
48. Bloomingdale v. Dreher, 31 F. (2d) 93 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929). 
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not conditioned on the granting of or even application for a dis- 
charge.49 In this connection it should be noted that a judgment upon 
a claim for negligent injury, including injuries arising out of auto- 
mobile accidents, is a "debt" which can be proved and is discharged 
by bankruptcy proceedings and therefore comes within the pro- 
tection of section 9.50 By statute in Massachusetts, 
"If a person arrested on mesne process or on execution becomes an in- 
solvent debtor under the laws of this commonwealth or a bankrupt under 
the laws of the United States, he shall be discharged upon his application. 
to a district court in the county where the arrest was made, after such 
notice as the court shall order." 51 
In absence of such statute it has been held that while application for 
habeas corpus may be made to the federal courts, comity suggests 
that it be made in the first instance to the state court.52 But that is 
not a requirement. 
Hence under these rules the two New Jersey debtors arrested on 
a ca. sa. and the two Boston debtors arrested on mesne process were 
clearly entitled to release on adjudication of bankruptcy. 
Commitments for contempt are not so clear. It is generally held 
that a stay of the collection of a judgment for a dischargeable debt 
by means of a contempt proceeding, ostensibly intended only to aid 
such collection comes within section 9 of the Bankruptcy Act. But 
if the order of contempt was intended as a punishment and not to 
assist merely in the collection of the debt, section 9 is held not to 
extend immunity to the bankrupt against commitment.53 Nor is 
immunity from arrest granted as respects contempts for failure to 
pay claims not dischargeable in bankruptcy, such as alimony,54 for 
49. Bissing v. Turkington, supra note 45. 
50. Ex parte Margiasso, supra note 44; Ex parte Harrison, supra note 46; 
Bissing v. Turkington, supra note 45; Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U. S. 467 (1925). 
Contra as to pure tort claims for unliquidated damages: Schall v. Camors,. 
251 U. S. 239 (1919). On claims for "willful and malicious injuries" not 
discharged, see Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U. S. 473 (1904). 
51. MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 224, § 29. 
52. United States ex rel. Scott v. McAleese, 93 Fed. 656 (C. C. A. 3d, 1899). 
53. In re Pyatt, supra note 28. In re Hall, 170 Fed. 721 (S. D. N. Y. 1909); 
In re Koronsky, 170 Fed. 719 (C. C. A. 2d, 1909). But the language in some 
cases is sufficiently broad to make no such distinction but to warrant denial 
of a stay in all cases of contempt committed prior to adjudication. In re 
Francisco, 245 Fed. 216 (N. D. N. Y. 1917). 
54. In re Frity, 152 Fed. 562 (E. D. N. Y. 1907); In re Houston, 94 Fed. 
119 D. Ky. (1899); Wagner v. United States, 104 Fed. 133 (C. C. A. 6th, 
1900). Alimony to become due is not a debt dischargeable in bankruptcy. § 17 
Bankruptcy Act; In re Pyatt, supra note 28. This was so held by the Supreme 
Court even prior to the 1903 amendment expressly so providing. Wetmore v. 
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fines for contempt,55 or willful and malicious injuries.56 But in 
cases of alimony,57 as in other cases,58 it seems that the court may in 
its discretion restrain such proceedings. And such stay is effective 
to restrain the state court from punishment for an alleged contempt 
committed before adjudication.59 
Prior to 1931, habeas corpus had been granted by the Federal 
court in Massachusetts in cases of commitments by the Poor Debtor 
Court whether for contempt 60 or not.61 But in a case in 1930, petition 
for habeas corpus was dismissed for the reason that the sentence of 
commitment for contempt was punitive, the debtors having been 
defiant, dishonest and deserving of punishment.62 And in 1931, in 
an unreported case rendered without opinion, the court refused 
habeas corpus in a contempt case from the Poor Debtors' Court ap- 
parently making a blanket ruling for all such commitments. It may 
Markoe, 196 U. S. 68 (1904); Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 575 (1901). 
Contra: In re Houston, supra. But in Heimberger v. Joseph, supra note 29, it 
was held that claims for alimony in arrears partly represented by notes were 
provable. 
A discharge in bankruptcy to be effective must be pleaded. Thus where after 
adjudication the bankrupt is sued on a provable debt and at no time from the 
commencement of the action until entry of judgment and issuance of execution 
a plea of bankruptcy or discharge in bankruptcy is made, the judgment may 
be enforced by arrest and is not open to collateral attack. Herschman v. Jus- 
tices of the Municipal Court, 220 Mass. 137, 107 N. E. 543 (1915). Cf. In re 
Lockwood, 240 Fed. 161 (E. D. N. Y. 1917). 
Similarly in other collateral attacks on the judgment rendered, as in suits 
in another jurisdiction on the judgment where for the first time discharge is 
pleaded in bar. Dimock v. Revere Copper Co., 117 U. S. 559 (1886). But en- 
forcement of such judgments have been enjoined in equity. Badger v. Jordan- 
Marsh Co., 256 Mass. 153, 152 N. E. 92 (1926). 
As to procedural devices to contest a decree of contempt for failure to comply 
with an order of the Poor Debtors' Court after a discharge in bankruptcy see 
Commissioner of Banks v. Tremont Trust Co., 267 Mass. 331, 166 N. E. 848 
(1929). Cf. In re Lockwood, supra. 
55. People v. Sheriff of Kings Co., 206 Fed. 566 (E. D. N. Y. 1913). 
56. In re Stone, 278 Fed. 566 (N. D. N. Y. 1922). 
57. Wagner v. United States, supra note 64. 
58. In re Fortunato, 123 Fed. 622 (S. D. N. Y. 1903); In re Adler, 144 
Fed. 659 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906) the court saying, at 661: "It would seem, there- 
fore, that it was the duty of the court to stay the contempt proceedings if the 
claim were one which could be proved and discharged in bankruptcy; surely 
to do so was within the sound discretion of the judge." The order restrained a 
judgment creditor in the state court from attempting to enforce its judgment 
by proceedings to punish the bankrupt for contempt. 
59. In re De Lany & Co., 124 Fed. 280 (N. D. N. Y. 1903); In re Fortunato, 
supra note 58. See Bankruptcy Act § 11. 
60. Boston American, Oct. 24, 1930. 
61. Ex parte Harrison, supra note 46. 
62. Fed. Misc. Civ. Docket, No. 4306. 
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well be that a presumption that such commitments are punitive is 
justified. Yet it would seem to be no more than a presumption, and 
certainly in cases of stays of proceedings in citation for contempt 
it could not be said that all citations for contempt in the Poor Debtor 
Court are primarily or presumptively for punishment rather than in 
aid of collection of debts. The way the court operates negatives any 
such presumption.63 
Thus it seems clear that adjudication in bankruptcy is ground for 
a stay against citation for contempt of the Poor Debtor Court, but 
probably not grounds for habeas corpus. The matter was academic 
as respects the two debtors who had been committed because they 
had already served their sentences when the bankruptcy petition 
was filed. Their petitions were to prevent other contempt proceed- 
ings. As respects the others from the Poor Debtor Court who were 
in contempt but who had not been arrested, it is clear that bank- 
ruptcy afforded immunity from arrest. After adjudication it seems 
clear that no arrest can be made in such proceedings.64 
Assignments of wages are strictly regulated by statute in Massa- 
chusetts.65 Assignments to secure a loan of less than $300 must, 
inter alia, exempt $10 a week, be accepted in writing by the employer, 
and if the assignor is married, consented to in writing by the wife. 
Such approval by employer and wife are required in the case of other 
assignments of wages; and in addition an exemption of three-fourths 
of the weekly earnings or wages of the assignor is necessary. These 
strict provisions doubtless are the reason why no wage assignments 
had been filed against any of the wage earners here studied. 
Garnishment in Massachusetts is regulated by statute providing 
that all personal actions (except malicious prosecution, slander, libel, 
assault and battery, and replevin) may be commenced by trustee 
process by serving and summoning any person as trustee of the 
defendant in the action.66 The person summoned as trustee must 
disclose what goods, effects or credits of the defendant were in his 
hands when the writ was served on him.67 The goods, effects or 
credits of the defendant in possession of the trustee are attached and 
63. See Nehemkis, op. cit. supra note 33. 
64. See National Surety Co. v. Reed, 262 Mass. 372, 374-5, 160 N. E. 281, 
282-3 (1928). 
65. MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 154. It should, however, be noted that 
Massachusetts has held, contrary to the weight of authority, that a wage 
assignment given before bankruptcy is a lien preserved by § 67 of the Bank- 
ruptcy Act and not affected by the discharge in bankruptcy of the assignor. 
Citizens Loan Assoc. v. Boston & Maine Rr., 196 Mass. 528, 82 N. E. 696 (1907). 
66. MASS. GEN. LAWS (1932) c. 246, § 1. 
67. Id. at § 10. 
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held to respond to final judgment as if they had been attached upon 
an original writ of attachment.68 To this there are several exceptions 
or qualifications. If wages for personal labor or services are attached 
for a debt other than for necessaries furnished the defendant or his 
family, an amount not exceeding twenty dollars is exempt; but in 
case of a debt for necessaries, where the writ contains a statement to 
that effect, then an amount not exceeding ten dollars is exempt.69 
Furthermore it is provided that no person shall be adjudged a trustee 
by reason of money or any other thing due from him to the defendant, 
unless it is, at the time of service of the writ upon him, due absolutely 
and without any contingency.70 But by other provisions a writ once 
served upon a trustee may be served again and with the same effect 
as if it had not been previously served.71 
Thus wages not due at the filing of the writ cannot be collected; 72 
but other writs may be served on successive pay days. Successive 
services, however, do not have the cumulative effect of reducing the 
amount of exemption by treating all services as but one attachment. 
Thus the debtor is entitled to the stated exemption at each service 
of the writ.73 Employment contracts have been worked out, however, 
so as to give immunity to the employer as trustee under the statute. 
One contract provided that the employer "may pay all wages earned 
at such times and in such parts as it may from time to time elect"; 
that the employee should not leave the employ "unless this contract 
68. Id. at § 20. 
69. Id. at § 29. 
70. Id. § 32. By this same section wages for personal labor or services of the 
wife or minor children of the defendant are exempt, as are wages of a seaman but 
not a fisherman. 
71. Id. at § 8. 
72. Hadley v. Peabody, 13 Gray 200 (1859) (The principal defendant was 
employed for a year at a salary of $1,000 payable quarterly; service of process 
was made about the middle of the quarter. It was held that there was no debt 
to trustee); Fellows v. Smith, 131 Mass. 363 (1881) (Employer had claim against 
employee-collection agent for unremitted balances exceeding amount of wages 
due); O'Brien v. Collins, 124 Mass. 98 (1878). And see cases collected 56 A. L. R. 
638 et seq. (1928); 20 L. R. A. (n. s.) 912 (1909). And see Wyman v. Hichborn, 
60 Mass. 264 (1850). 
But where the Commonwealth is the employer it cannot be trusteed. Dewey v. 
Garvey, 130 Mass. 86 (1881). For further cases see 56 A. L. R. 602-624 (1928); 40 L. R. A. (n. s.) 218 (1912); 46 L. R. A. (n. s.) 301 (1913). But cities, towns, 
and counties may be summoned as trustees. Hooker v. McLennan, 236 Mass. 117, 
127 N. E. 626 (1920). But not where an assessor's right to compensation from a 
town for services rendered was based upon statute and not upon an express or 
implied contract with the town. Walker v. Cook, 129 Mass. 577 (1880). 
73. Hall v. Hartwell, 142 Mass. 447, 8 N. E. 333 (1886). Accord: Howard 
Coal Co. v. Savage, 116 Me. 115, 100 Atl. 369 (1917). And see Sullivan v. Had- 
ley Co., 160 Mass. 32, 35 N. E. 103 (1893); L. R. A. 1917D 899-900. 
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is terminated by mutual assent, or as herein provided, without giving 
thirty days' notice thereof, and working out such notice"; and that 
"all wages earned shall at all times be held liable to entire forfeiture 
to said company, in case of leaving without first giving and working 
out the full time of such notice." At the date of the process the em- 
ployee was at work under the contract, not having given notice of 
intent to leave. The employer had no fixed days for paying employees 
but usually paid each month a "part of their wages, retaining the 
balance under the contract." The employer claimed that all wages 
earned by the defendant were held by it under the contract and that 
they were not absolutely due, being subject to the forfeiture. The 
wages earned since the last payment amounted to $19.46, for which 
sum the trustee was charged. It did not appear whether or not the 
balance of wages retained by the employer on pay days was more than 
nominal. The court discharged the trustee.74 Ames, J. said: 
"We cannot say that such a contract, fairly and deliberately made, is un- 
reasonable, oppressive, or contrary to public policy. It imposes no burden 
upon the workman that he cannot at any time remove by giving the stipu- 
lated notice. It secures the employer against interruption of his business 
by the abrupt withdrawal of help. And so far as it has a tendency to 
prevent the expense and annoyance of trustee suits, it is a convenience 
which, in the absence of fraud, defeats no legal right and interferes with 
no legal claim of any other party." 75 
The same result has been reached in Massachusetts 7' and in many 
other jurisdictions 77 where wages are paid in advance. In the Mas- 
sachusetts case the employer by the contract of employment agreed 
to pay defendant monthly in advance. This advance was not made 
directly to the employee but to a third person who was treasurer of 
the trustee. The court in holding the trustee not liable said it made 
no difference whether at the time of the trustee process the em- 
ployee had actually received the salary from the treasurer. In either 
event the employer's liability had been discharged. 
As a result of trusteeships 84 of the 301 Boston bankrupts filed 
their petitions. The wages had been trusteed usually many times, the 
greatest number being 40 in one year. Seven of the bankrupts had 
been discharged by their employers as a result of trusteeships. And 
in six of the cases the employer had threatened discharge unless the 
trusteeships ceased. One was a large company in Boston which had 
74. Potter v. Cain, 117 Mass, 238 (1875). Cf. Faulkner v. Waters, 28 Mass. 
472 (1831). 
75. Potter v. Cain, supra note 74, at 240-241. 
76. Callaghan v. Pocasset Mfg. Co., 119 Mass. 173 (1875). 
77. See cases collected 56 A. L. R. 629 et seq. (1928). 
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adopted the policy of permitting two trusteeships but threatening 
discharge if more than two were had. So far as could be learned this 
policy was rather strictly carried out. 
Of the remaining Boston cases the pressure of creditors had not 
advanced to legal methods of collection. In 10 cases, however, suits 
had been started and in 16 judgments had been rendered. 
Attachments, or garnishments, of wages in New Jersey before 
judgment are considerably more restricted than in Massachusetts. 
There must be (1) a liquidated claim arising ex contractu and an 
affidavit of the creditor that the debtor absconds from his creditors 
and is not resident in the state at the time; or that the debtor is not 
a resident of the state; or (2) an order for attachment by a judge or 
commissioner upon proof by affidavit of fraud which would warrant 
an order for a capias ad respondendum.78 Another statute, broader 
in scope, includes actions in tort and unliquidated contract claims, 
applies to resident as well as non-resident defendants and requires a 
judicial order to precede the attachment. The instances most ap- 
plicable here where attachment may be had are in cases (1) where 
there are facts sufficient to hold defendant to bail and (2) where the 
cause of action arises in the state, the defendant absconds or is a 
non-resident, and summons cannot be served.79 Excepted from at- 
tachment are wages due a non-resident employee in suits by a non- 
resident creditor; 80 and wages of soldiers and sailors who served in 
the World War in suits to collect debts contracted prior to the war.81 
But after judgment has been recovered 82 and execution returned 
wholly or partly unsatisfied and wages to the amount of eighteen 
dollars or more per week are due the judgment debtor or shall be- 
come due him the judgment creditor may obtain from the court, with- 
out notice to the judgment debtor, an order directing execution 
against the wages. This execution on presentation to the employer 
becomes a lien and a continuing levy upon the wages in an amount 
78. N. J. COMP. STAT. (1910) p. 133. For statutory regulations of capias ad 
respondendum, see N. J. COMP. STAT. (1910) pp. 4068 et seq., Hisor v. Vandiver, 83 N. J. L. 433, 85 Atl. 181 (1912); Williams & Davis, Inc. v. Davis, 147 Atl. 337 (N. J. L. 1929). 
79. N. J. COMP. STAT. (1910) p. 4076. That the two statutes are supplemen- 
tary and cumulative see Hotel Registry Realty Corp. v. Stafford, 70 N. J. L. 528, 57 Atl. 145 (1904); and see Henry v. Freeman, 145 Atl. 107 (N. J. L. 1929). See 
generally HARRIS, op. cit. supra note 34, ch. VII. 
80. Id. at 133, changing the rule of Leonard v. Lawrence, 32 N. J. L. 355 (1867). 
81. N. J. LAWS (1920) c. 304, p. 552. 
82. For aplication of the provision to district courts see 8 N. J. LAWS (1924) 
c. 204, p. 431; N. J. COMP. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1911-24) § 61-204K. As to juris- diction of District Courts, see N. J. COMP. STAT. (1910) p. 1962; N. J. LAWS (1926) c. 225. 
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not exceeding 10% of the income unless the income is in excess of 
$1,000 a year. In the latter event the judge "may order a larger 
percentage." 83 Only one execution, however, against the wages 
may be satisfied at one time.84 In interpreting the statute the Court 
of Errors and Appeals has said: 
"The statute is in derogation of the common law rights of the debtor. It 
takes from him, without notice, and without a hearing, property which, 
except for the statute, is exempt from execution. It is, therefore, neces- 
sary for the creditor and the court in attempting to enforce the right 
given by the statute to follow its provisions strictly." 85 
In that case the income (rentals from realty) of the judgment 
debtor exceeded $1,000 a year and the lower court ordered an execu- 
tion to issue against the rentals to the full amount until the judg- 
ment was paid. In affirming a judgment vacating the order, the court 
said: 
"The order under review entirely disregards this important right of 
the judgment debtor to retain for his own use and benefit all of the wages, 
earnings, salary, &c., which shall come to him from time to time, except a 
percentage thereof to be fixed by the court or judge, and paid from time 
to time upon the execution." 86 
What review will be had of the discretion of the judge in fixing 
the percentage of wages to be paid on execution is not clear. But 
apparently the judge in fixing the percentage must take into con- 
sideration minimum costs of living of the debtor. As stated in one 
case: 
"This judicial discretion is vested in the judge, so that not all the wages 
shall be garnished and the debtor be at once deprived of his wages, but 
83. N. J. LAWS (1915) c. 266, p. 470, as amended; N. J. LAWS (1916) c. 113, 
p. 242; N. J. COMP. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1911-24) § 71-9L. The statute applies to 
decrees in chancery as well as to judgments at law. White v. White, 94 N. J. 
Eq. 278, 120 Atl. 419 (1923). See generally Harris, op. cit. supra note 34, ch. 
XXI, § § 629-630, 646. 
84. But it has been held that this limitation applies to executions from the 
same court. Thus where the Supreme Court has made an order, the District 
Court at the same time could levy pursuant to the same provision under its act. 
Berkowitz v. First District Court, 8 N. J. Misc. R. 847, 152 Atl. 847 (1930). 
The statute permits an execution against the salary of a municipal officer. 
Petersen v. Jersey City, 89 N. J. L. 93, 97 Atl. 963 (1916) (policeman); Oetjen v. 
Hintemann, 91 N. J. L. 429, 106 Atl. 213 (1916). See generally 56 A. L. R. 602 
(1928). Prior to this statute the rule was contra. Spencer v. Morris, 67 N. J. L. 
500, 51 Atl. 470 (1902). On the constitutionality of such statutes see Cavender 
v. Hewitt, 145 Tenn. 471, 239 S. W. 767 (1921) and cases collected 22 A. L. R. 
760 (1923). 
85. Trapp v. Brown, 93 N. J. L. 171, 173, 107 Atl. 413, 414 (1919). 
86. Ibid. 
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that, in case of the debtor and his family, only such portion of the debt 
shall be paid, from time to time, as will leave the debtor's family unim- 
poverished." 87 
Prior to judgment, attachment of wages can be had only in the 
rather exceptional case. And after judgment wages can be reached 
only upon execution pursuant to statute.88 
In the New Jersey salaried group there were no cases of bank- 
ruptcy following an attachment of wages. And there were but four 
cases where the judgment creditor had obtained execution on wages. 
In one of these cases the salary was so irregular as to make the 
execution in wages particularly severe on the debtor. In two other 
cases a judgment creditor had threatened wage execution. In the 
balance the pressure of creditors was not through the law. 
Assignments of wages, under the Small Loan Act in force in New 
Jersey at the time of this study, had to be accepted in writing by the 
employer, and consented to in writing by the wife.89 
Assignments of wages for other purposes are with one exception 
subject only to the general rules of common law and equity which, 
with certain restrictions,90 permit the assignment, equity vesting 
the "equitable title to the money in the assignee." 91 The exception 
is a statute making unlawful assignments of wages upon which the 
assignee receives directly or indirectly more than the legal rate of 
interest upon the amount of wages due. But there is excluded from 
the act assignments made for the payment of goods or merchandise 
sold the employee for full value or for any professional service 
rendered him.92 
But in the salaried group of bankrupts from New Jersey there were 
no cases where wage assignments had been filed or used as collection 
devices by the creditors. 
87. Margarum v. Moon, 63 N. J. Eq. 586, 590, 53 Atl. 179, 181 (1902). 88. Ibid. 
89. N. J. LAWS (1914) c. 49, p. 79; N. J. COMP. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1911-24) § 35-19. Further restrictions were imposed by the Small Loan Act of 1932. By that act assignments of wages to secure such loans must, inter alia, be in writ- 
ing and signed by both husband and wife and are valid as respects 10% of the 
wages. N. J. LAWS (1932) c. 62. 
90. As for example the rule prohibiting the assignment of unearned salary of 
a public officer. Schwenk v. Wyckoff, 46 N. J. Eq. 560, 22 Atl. 259 (1890) (re- tired U. S. army officer). 
91. See Brindge v. Atlantic City Policeman's Benefit Assoc., 75 N. J. Eq. 405, 72 Atl. 435 (1909), aff'd, 77 N. J. Eq. 272, 79 Atl. 686 (1910). 
92. N. J. COMP. STAT. (1910) pp: 3048-49. But it has been said that this 
statute does not affect the validity of the contract but only renders the assignee liable to prosecution for misdemeanor. Rosenbusch v. Frey, 5 N. J. Misc, Rep. 
312, 136 Atl. 711 (1927). 
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The picture then which these cases give of the relationship between 
bankruptcy and various collection devices is of interest. As respects 
wage assignments the incidence is nil in both districts. Likewise 
body executions and, in New Jersey, attachments and execution on 
wages are quite inconspicuous. In contrast are the prominence of 
trusteeships of wages and supplementary process in the Poor Debtor 
Court in Boston. Those two together were the direct occasion for 
filing of the petition in two-thirds of the cases. If this sample of cases 
is representative, the toll over a period of years is enormous. 
Can Wage Earner Bankrupts Pay? 
Collection devices have an important bearing on the problem of 
providing a moratorium for wage earners and of devising a machinery 
which will enable them to pay their debts. There are two aspects of 
this problem: (1) can wage earner bankrupts pay their debts if giVen 
adequate time? and (2) assuming some machinery for amortization is 
advisable, should it be vested in federal or state agencies? 
It is common knowledge that the bulk of wage earner bankrupts 
have no assets whatsoever, above their legal exemptions, which 
creditors can reach for satisfaction of their claims.93 This was in 
general true of the Boston and New Jersey cases as shown by the 
following summary: 
Boston New Jersey 
No Assets 79.4% 34.5% 
$1 to $100 9.3 10.2 
$101 to $250 2.6 14.0 
$250 to $500 2.3 11.2 
Total less than $500 93.6 69.9 
Both Boston and New Jersey cases, particularly the latter, had 
highly inflated or padded assets due to the listing of so many equities 
in real estate. The total liabilities of the Boston wage earners was 
$4,108,075; the assets (not as appraised but as scheduled), $259,559. 
For New Jersey the figures were $2,508,290 for liabilities; and 
$330,983 for assets. 
93, Thus for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1930, in all wage earner cases for 
the entire country the following were the asset groups: 
No assets 84.90% 
$1 to $100 9.46 
$101 to $250 2.70 
$250 to $500 1.11 
Total less than $500 98.17 
See Strengthening Procedure in the Judicial System, supra note 4, at 7. And 
see Douglas and Marshall, A Factual Study of Bankruptcy Administration and 
Some Suggestions (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 25. 
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The total of $6,616,365 seems at first blush a staggering load of 
debt for 408 wage earners to carry. In this connection it should be 
noted that these cases do not present the picture of people contracting 
debts and thereupon rushing off to bankruptcy to be relieved of them. 
Financial embarrassment for less than a year was present in but 
13% of the Boston cases. In 66.4% of the cases this financial em- 
barrassment had continued for two years or more and in 46.2% 
for three years or more. The average was three and a half years; the 
median somewhat less than three years.94 
Yet in spite of these enormous debts and small assets and the 
relatively long period of time during which these debtors have en- 
deavored to extricate themselves from difficulty, it is frequently sug- 
gested that they could pay if they would or that they could and would 
if only a moratorium were declared. Creditors of the Boston and 
New Jersey bankrupts almost invariably stated such opinion apropos 
of their contention that bankruptcy was too obviously a sanctuary 
for the protection of recalcitrant and dishonest debtors. In the same 
connection, suggestions have been made from time to time that some 
proration or amortization provision be embodied in the Bankruptcy 
Act making it possible for wage earners to pay off their creditors 
under the protection of the court. Such provision has been included 
in the bankruptcy bill prepared by the Department of Justice and 
introduced in the 72d Congress,95 whereby a wage earner 96 may be 
allowed to amortize or fund his debts over a period of not more than 
two years.97 
In the report accompanying the proposed bill the Department of 
Justice gave the following reasons 98 in support of the provision: 
"Our inquiry has led us to the following conclusions: (1) That most 
wage earners who fall into debt desire to pay their debts in full and wish 
to avoid the stigma of bankruptcy; (2) that they are driven into bank- 
ruptcy chiefly by garnishments and other attachments, even in the midst 
of an effort to pay in installments; (3) that at least a third of the wage 
earners who are now forced into bankruptcy and released from their debts 
could, if given time and protection, pay their creditors in full; (4) that if 
94. Fiirth, The Critical Period Before Bankruptcy (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 853, 
855, 863. 
95. SEN. Doc. 3866, 72d Congress, 1st Sess. 
96. Id. at § 1 (a) (27), defining wage earner as an individual "who works for 
wages, salary or hire." 
97. Id. § 75. The two year period is of course arbitrary. But it seems more desirable than a longer period. Certainly an early determination of ability to 
pay is necessary. To prolong the period of amortization seems undesirable not 
only in view of the administrative tasks involved but also in light of the vicis- 
situdes of life for the average wage earner. 
98. Strengthening of Procedure in the Judicial System, supra note 4, at 80. 
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the law offered such relief without stigma, a still larger number of wage 
earners, who now resort to loan companies in an effort to stave off their 
creditors and gradually get into debt beyond their capacity to pay, would 
find a means of relief at a comparatively early stage of indebtedness." 
In support of the third reason given above, the Report went on to 
say: 99 
. .. An analysis of the wage-earner bankruptcies closed in the fiscal 
year 1930 in the 10 districts having the largest number of these bank- 
ruptcies revealed that at least 12 per cent of these wage earners had debts 
of under $250; that at least 12 per cent had debts of from $250 to $500; 
and that at least 25 per cent had debts of from $500 to $1,000. Thus, in 
about half the cases . . . the debts were $1,000 or less. In at least another 
24 per cent of the cases the debts were from $1,000 to $2,000; so that, all 
told, nearly three fourths of these bankrupts owed from $2,000 on down. 
"It is hard to believe that many, if not most, of these bankrupts, with 
small debts could not have paid them in installments .... 
"While the study has not been completed, a preliminary examination of 
the referees' reports and of case history reports submitted by business 
organizations, showed that in innumerable cases the ratio of the monthly 
income of wage earner bankrupts to their total debts was at least 1 
to 6. ." 
It is of interest to speculate as to the probable success of amortiza- 
tion, under the proposed bankruptcy amendment, of the debts of the 
salaried group of Boston and New Jersey bankrupts. In the first 
place it would be hazardous to rely on the foregoing estimates without 
knowing not only the amount of obligations but also the income of 
the debtor and the number of people dependent on him for support. 
Without the latter, estimates would be unreliable. The fact that the 
ratio of monthly income to total debts was at least 1 to 6 is likewise 
of little significance without knowing if the monthly income after 
deducting enough for subsistence left any balance for debts. 
From a study made in 1927 by the National Industrial Conference 
Board of costs of living in twelve industrial cities it is reported that 
the average minimum cost of maintaining a fair American standard 
of living for the family of an industrial worker, his wife and two 
children living in Boston was $1,627.33.100 
Writing in 1925 Paul H. Douglas stated four main standards or 
levels of living applicable to the working class family of five.'0' 
Poverty level.'02 "While costs necessarily vary from city to city it 
99. Id. at 82-83. 
100. THE COST OF LIVING IN TWELVE INDUSTRIAL CITIES, op. cit. supra note 
16, at 51. 
101. DOUGLAS, PAUL H., WAGES AND THE FAMILY (1925) 5-6. 
102. Id. at 5: "On this standard, the family is not on a basis of permanent 
self-support, and exists because of inroads which it makes upon its own health 
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is probable that it would cost a family of five between $1,000 and 
$1,100 to live on this scale in the larger American cities at the pres- 
ent time." 103 (2) Minimum-of-subsistence level.104 "At the present 
time, families of five in the larger American cities would need some- 
where between $1,100 and $1,400 to live on this level." 105 (3) The 
subsistence-plus, or the minimum health-and-decency-level.106 "Such 
a standard would seem to cost from $1,500 to $1,800 in most of the 
larger American cities." 107 (4) The minimum-of-comfort-level.l08 
"The cost of such a standard for a family of five at the present time 
would probably range somewhere between $2,000 and $2,400 in our 
larger cities." 109 
A later study concluded that 
"In 1928-29, according to the estimates of competent economists and social 
workers, a family of five living in urban communities in the United States, 
needed from $1,000 to $1,500 to maintain a minimum subsistence standard 
of living. On the whole, the estimates indicate that $1,200 or $1,300 is 
needed rather than less. ... In the same period the cost of maintain- 
ing a minimum comfort standard of living was in the neighborhood of 
$1,800 to $2,000." 110 
or upon its supply of furniture and goods. The family's dietary is generally ap- 
preciably below the standard of 3,300 calaries which are needed for an adult male 
at moderately heavy labor. The family is badly overcrowded and has no resources 
with which to meet any unexpected expense." 
103. Ibid. 
104. Ibid: "Families living on this standard receive enough to maintain 
themselves physically, but not enough to meet the major emergencies of illness, 
accidents, old age, etc., or to enjoy social pleasures that cost money. Since 
such families will in practice tend to insist upon securing some of these pleas- 
ures, they will in consequence tend to be somewhat undernourished and appreci- 
ably overcrowded." 
105. Ibid. 
106. Id. at 6: "A sufficient surplus is accumulated to enable the standard 
family decently to house itself in five rooms or, at the worst, in four, to pur- 
chase food with sufficient calories to meet the needs of the family, and to buy 
cheap but neat clothing. In addition, a modest balance would be available for 
recreation and for sundries." 
107. Ibid. 
108. Ibid: "It is this that is commonly thought of when one speaks of 'the American standard of living.' A much more liberal standard of clothing, hous- ing, and of sundries now becomes possible. Adequate insurance against the industrial risks may be purchased, and an appreciable amount of amusement 
and recreation may be enjoyed.. . . Such a level of living, while desired by 
all, has, however, been attained by only a small proportion of the industrial 
wage earners." 
109. Ibid. 
110. Reed, The Ability to Pay for Medical Care, v-11, Publication No. 25 
of THE COMMITTEE ON THE COSTS OF MEDICAL CARE. 
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For comparison with the foregoing studies are the statistics col- 
lected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1918 and 1919,111 for 
Boston and for 92 industrial centers. From these data 112 it is seen 
that at least 65 % of the families in Boston and in the entire group of 
92 industrial centers had incomes below that set by the National 
Industrial Conference Board. About 23% were on the "poverty 
level" of Paul H. Douglas. About 65% were on the "minimum-of- 
subsistence level" or lower. Only about 8 or 9% were on the 
"minimum-of-comfort level." And in the study previously quoted 
it is said, 
"With due allowance for the fact that the average family of low income 
probably has somewhat less than 4.4 members instead of 5 members, and 
that the costs of living may be lower in rural areas than in cities, one may 
conservatively estimate that in 1928 not less than 8 per cent of all families 
of more than one person in this country were unable to afford a minimum 
subsistence standard of living. . . . This standard of living ("minimum 
comfort") was beyond the reach of at least one-third of the population of 
the country." 113 
Of course these studies are not strictly comparable. The methods 
probably varied and the periods of time studied were different. 
Adjustments for changing price levels and wage scales, of course, 
would have to be made if they were to be used in 1933. And further 
adjustments for different sized families would have to be made if 
they were employed in an amortization scheme. For example, in 
the Boston and New Jersey studies the family of five 114 or family 
of four 115 did not predominate, though the average was about four. 
111. Cost of Living in the United States, op. cit. supra note 11. "This in- 
vestigation covered white families in 92 cities or localities in 42 states, the cities 
varying in size from New York to small country towns of a few thousand popu- 
lation." 
112. Id. at 5, 11. 
113. Reed, op. cit. supra note 110, at v-15. 
114. Using the categories of Paul H. Douglas, the thirty-three families of 
five in Boston were distributed as follows: (1) Poverty level-11; (2) Mini- 
mum-of-subsistence level-7; (3) Subsistence Plus level-4; (4) Minimum-of- 
Comfort level-7; (5) In excess of minimum-of-comfort-4. 
115. Of the fifty-six families of four in Boston, 28 had incomes below the 
minimum set by the National Industrial Conference Board; 27 had incomes 
above that minimum. 
As reported by the 1930 census, of the 29,904,663 families in the United States 
7.9% were one-person families; 23.4%, two-person families; 20.8%, three-person 
families; 17.5%, four-person families; and 12%, five-person families. The 
median size of family for native whites was 3.34; for foreign born whites, 
3.74. See U. S. Daily, Nov. 25, 1932, at 1717. 
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The various sized families were 
SIZE OF FAMILY 
Members Boston New Jersey 
No. Cases 
1 (bachelor) 27 14 
2 53 19 
3 42 19 
4 56 23 
5 33 12 
6 27 6 
7 12 1 
8 6 1 
9 5 0 
10 3 0 
12 1 
264 96 
Average 3.8 Average 3.3 
Yet in spite of these limitations the other studies are both useful and 
suggestive in considering the theoretical and practical aspects of the 
proposed amortization provision. 
At once there is raised a problem of considerable social and eco- 
nomic importance. What standard of living should be adopted? 
Though the system is not made compulsory, nevertheless, as has been 
pointed out,116 wage earners may well be under pressure of creditors 
to amortize; and excessive optimism may well lead to attempts to 
do so. If the standard of living is at the minimum subsistence level, 
should the administrator in charge permit it to be reduced to the 
poverty level for a two year period in order to pay creditors? In 
dealing with such cases would that class of debtor be better served 
by being led directly to the bankruptcy execution block? Obviously 
these are questions that cannot be answered by legislative mandate. 
They are matters of administrative discretion. As such they are of 
vital importance. 
In analyzing these bankruptcies the cases have been divided into 
income groups. Included in income are contributions from other 
members of the family. The income is that for the entire year pre- 
ceding the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy. It may 
be added that no follow-up of these cases has been made to ascertain 
116. Douglas and Marshall, op. cit. supra note 93. 
In this connection it is interesting to note the whole-hearted support given 
the amortization provision of the proposed bankruptcy amendments by certain 
retail credit organizations. One circular states that it will give wage earners 
"a chance to save their names and play fair with creditors by paying their 
obligations out of earnings;" and that it will "throw the protection of the 
United States Department of Justice around the Retail Creditor" who it is 
insisted now "takes it on the chin." 
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if the income increased or decreased after bankruptcy. Against in- 
come has been placed the number of dependents (so as to estimate 
roughly the cost of living) and the amount of indebtedness. From 
indebtedness have been deducted assets at their scheduled value. 
Common sense, not formulae, supplies the answer in the vast majority 
of the cases. 
The results obtained in the salaried group of Boston bankrupts are 
set forth below. 
AMORTIZATION 
Income Group No. Probable Doubtful Impossible 
No Income 14 0 0 14 
$500 or less 11 0 0 11 
$1000 and over $500 51 0 0 51 
$1500 and over $1000 66 3 18 45 
$2000 and over $1500 65 5 17 43 
$3000 and over $2000 51 8 14 29 
$4000 and over $3000 9 1 1 7 
Over $4000 10 3 0 7 
277 20 50 207 
Income unknown 24 
Percentage 7.3% 18% 74.7% 
In the "doubtful" column have been placed those cases where 
mathematically amortization would be possible but where (1) col- 
lateral circumstances indicate the debtor would be very averse to 
undertaking an amortization due to his dislike for the dominant 
creditor or his general attitude towards his debts; (2) the health of 
the debtor coupled with his low income makes successful amortiza- 
tion unlikely and the wisdom of beginning it dubious; or (3) an 
attempt at amortization would in all probability reduce the standard 
of living to such an extent as to place the families involved on a 
poverty or at least a bare subsistence level. The following are ex- 
amples of cases in this classification. Two debtors owed $401 and 
$407 respectively. One with four dependents had an income of 
$1400; the other with three dependents had an income of $1320. In 
case of the former, amortization, if elective, probably would not be 
undertaken for the reason that the debtor went into bankruptcy to 
get rid of debts incurred by an extravagant wife whom he had just 
divorced. In the other it might be attempted. But to do so would 
reduce this family pretty close to a poverty level. In another case 
the debtor earned $1000, had one dependent and owed $485. To 
amortize the debt in two years would require deduction of $20 a 
month from his salary leaving but $60 for two people to live on. 
Theoretically amortization might be undertaken. In view, however, 
of this bankrupt's precarious health it would seem unwise, if not 
impossible, to do it. In a higher income group was a wage earner 
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who owed $490, earned $2200 and was the head of a family of seven 
totally dependent on him. It is obvious he would refuse to amortize 
even though he could since the entire amount was owed on an ac- 
commodation indorsement for a friend and there was ill will existing 
between the debtor and the creditor. 
In the "probable" column are cases where mathematically amortiza- 
tion is possible without undue pressure on the debtor and where no 
collateral circumstances appear which would make it seem likely 
that the debtor would be unwilling. It cannot, of course, be said 
with certainty that in each of these cases the debtor would under an 
elective system be willing. Examples of cases classified here are as 
follows. One, who owed $494 had no dependents and an income of 
$1800, could probably amortize; as could another who owed $400, 
had one dependent and earned $1600. In a higher income group was 
a wage earner who owed $434, earned $2700 and had two dependents. 
Another was a skilled worker having one dependent, earning $3000, 
and owing $1600. 
In the "impossible" column have been placed those cases where 
the number of dependents and the ratio of debts to income make a 
two year period of amortization out of the question. Here are in- 
cluded all of the cases in the three lower income groups. In the 
"no income" group the average indebtedness was $6091. Only 4 had 
debts of less than $500, the smallest being $50. In the "$500 or less" 
group the average indebtedness was $3599 and in only 2 cases were 
the debts less than $500. And in the next group the average in- 
debtedness was $10,536. In only 3 cases was the indebtedness $500 
or less. Other cases classified here ranged from instances where the 
income was $1200 a year, the debts $600 and the number of depend- 
ents 6, to situations where the salary was from $4000 to $12,000 a 
year and the debts were many hundred times that sum. 
A detailed analysis for the small group of New Jersey cases will 
not be presented here. The results of the analysis, however, are as follows: 
AMORTIZATION 
Income Group No. Probable Doubtful Impossible No income 5 5 
$500 or less 1 1 
$1000 and over $500 3 3 
$1500 and over $1000 10 1 9 $2000 and over $1500 16 1 2 13 
$3000 and over $2000 17 2 3 12 
Over $3000 5 5 
57 4 5 48 
Income unknown 50 
Percentage 8% 10 , Ro9 
_- 
_ 
v V" /V 
The results are not materially different from those in the Boston 
group. It is of interest that in the four cases where amortization 
was probable, three had liabilities composed entirely of automobile 
accident judgments and one of accommodation liability. Whether such 
claims would be so willingly amortized as ordinary mercantile claims 
may well be doubted. Therefore, only a more liberal classification 
than that used in the Boston cases permits the addition of these four 
cases to the "probable" column. 
The extent to which the Boston and New Jersey cases were af- 
fected by the current depression is impossible to conjecture. As 
previously noted the New Jersey cases came into bankruptcy in the 
fall and winter of 1929 and the spring of 1930, before the full force 
of the depression was felt, while the Boston cases came in during the 
fall and winter of 1930 and the spring of 1931. Even so, as has been 
seen, the percentages of probable amortizations do not vary 
materially. 
If these cases are representative, the estimate of the Department 
of Justice must be greatly revised. From these cases it certainly is 
not "hard to believe that many, if not most, of these bankrupts with 
small debts could not have paid them in installments." A probable 
danger in any amortization scheme is that those in the doubtful 
column would be subjected to considerable pressure on the part of 
their creditors to attempt amortization. As has been seen, in most 
of these cases amortization would mean reduction of the standard of 
living to an extremely low level. Should that be done? It seems 
that not even an attempt should be made. The social cost is likely 
to be too great. Whether or not it would be done would depend, of 
course, on the quality of administration under the act and the will- 
ingness or reluctance of the officials to turn the screws as hard as 
possible. As a practical matter, if it were done, it would probably 
mean the admission into the scheme of a host of cases, marginal at 
the very best, which soon after admission would default and increase 
enormously the administrative task. In view then of these various 
factors, it would seem unwise to count on the bulk of the doubtful 
column for the grist of the mill. 
The debts of these wage earners from Boston and New Jersey were 
somewhat larger than those of the wage earner bankrupts studied 
by the Department of Justice.17 The distribution was as follows: 
117. Strengthening of Procedure in the Judicial System, supra note 4. at 
82-83. The group of Boston and New Jersey cases included in the table are 
the 284 to which amortization was applied. 
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% Dept. of Justice 
Liabilities No. % (approx.) 
Under $250 6 2.1 12 
$250 to $500 12 4.2 12 
$500 to $1000 78 27.5 25 
$1000 to $2000 81 28.5 24 
Thus, while the Boston and New Jersey groups had about 62% of 
cases with liabilities below $2,000, the Department of Justice group 
had about 73%. 
It is true, of course, that most of the probable amortizations came 
in the group with debts of less than $2,000. The distribution was; 
Under $250 0 
$250 to $500 3 
$500 to $1000 10 
$1000 to $2000 8 
$2000 to $5000 3 
24 
The percentage then of wage earners with debts of less than $2000 
which probably could be amortized is about 13%. If this group is 
representative, an increase in numbers of the group to correspond 
with the figures of the Department of Justice would not substantially 
increase the percentage of cases where amortization was probable. 
As a practical matter the volume of debts which these 24 bank- 
rupts would amortize is almost infinitesimal as compared with the 
total indebtedness of the entire group. The 24 had liabilities of 
$26,971. The entire salaried group had liabilities of $6,616,365. 
Amortization then would result in the payment of only .4% of the 
entire liabilities of all the bankrupt wage earners. This fact coupled 
with the further fact that amortization would reach such a small 
percentage of bankrupts raises serious doubts as to the advisability 
of instituting such a system for bankrupts. The net seems out of all 
proportions to the catch. 
But these objections are not necessarily conclusive of the case 
against amortization. 
The Department of Justice believes that 
"if the law offered such relief without stigma a large number of wage 
earners who now resort to loan companies in an effort to stave off their 
creditors and gradually get into debt beyond their capacity to pay would 
find a means of relief at a comparatively early stage of indebtedness." 
In other words, the wage earner in bankruptcy may represent such 
an extreme pathological case that what amortization could do for 
him would be no reliable measure of what it could do for wage earners 
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generally. While the wage earner in bankruptcy is helpless and needs 
the execution block of the discharge, he might have obtained the 
necessary relief had amortization been available to him months 
earlier. 
Proof or disproof of this is impossible. Are wage earners in 
bankruptcy typical of wage earner-debtors generally? To what 
extent could wage earner-debtors effectively employ the amortiza- 
tion scheme? Would the number of cases and volume of debts be 
too negligible to justify inauguration of some such system? 
Answers to these questions are at best guesses. The idea has been 
so highly regarded as to be incorporated in the draft of the proposed 
Uniform Municipal Court Act.s18 And some twelve of the Ohio 
municipal courts have had amortization provisions for a number of 
years.19 Perhaps the answer to the questions may be found in the 
experience of those courts. In absence of that, the only definite and 
concrete material is that from the files of the American Amortization 
Company of Chicago, which for a number of years has without aid of 
statute engaged in such activity. Cases from the files of that com- 
pany were taken where the debtor had three dependents, i.e., cases 
of families of four. These debtors were wage earners most of whom 
were public utility employees. The majority of them earned between 
$2080 and $2600 a year. The minimum standard of living was 
arbitrarily set at $1500.120 The surplus annual income over that sum 
was assumed to be available for payment of their debts; and a two 
year period was taken as the term for amortization. The result 
reached was that 82% clearly or probably could amortize over a two 
year period.121 The estimate is probably a liberal one as it is by no 
118. Uniform Municipal Court Act, Draft Prepared by Professor Hessel E. 
Yntema. 
119. The statute giving such power to the municipal court of Columbus is 
typical, OHIO GEN. CODE, (Page, 1931) § 1558-54c. In addition the Cleveland 
Municipal Court inaugurated such a system in 1932 without aid of statute. 
120. This is somewhat lower than the estimated standard of living for a family 
of five in Chicago in 1929 which has been estimated as $1,938.44 on the basis 
of 1929 prices. These amounts were said to be "the least that are required . . . 
'for a manner of living that will make possible a high standard of physical, 
mental, and moral health and efficiency for adults, the full physical and mental 
growth of children, and provide for their moral welfare."' See Reed, op. cit. 
supra note 110, pp. v-15. 
121. AMORTIZATION 
Annual Income Yes Probable Doubtful No 
Under $2080 15 11 6 19 
$2080-$2600 78 4 3 
Over $2600 15 
Total cases-151 
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means clear that $1500 was an adequate minimum for that class of 
employee. If such cases are common, amortization might well serve 
a genuine service to this type of debtor. The contrast to the bank- 
ruptcy cases is striking. This material, though extremely limited, 
suggests the possibility of the use of amortization in advance of bank- 
ruptcy to serve a function not normally performed by collection de- 
vices today. 
But granting the desirability of having available for such debtors 
some legal machinery of amortization, the problem of determining 
whether it should be vested in federal or state agencies remains. As 
discussed above,122 collection devices available to creditors vary much 
from state to state. Furthermore, the type of creditor has much to 
do with the degree of pressure to which the debtor is subjected.123 
The assumed need for amortization reflects the pressure of creditors 
-both legal and extra-legal---on debtors with the resultant fear 
of loss of job, loss of wages, commitment to jail, etc. And control of 
the business of these creditors as well as control of the collection de- 
vices is in the hands of the states not Congress. 
Those considerations point clearly to the conclusion that amortiza- 
tion should be under state control as an integral part of the bank- 
ruptcy power. The determination of when creditors should be paid, 
and under what conditions, is but another phase of the decision of 
when a debtor should be released from his obligations. Both entail 
much the same process. They call for consideration of types of 
creditors, the antecedents of the debtor's financial difficulties, his in- 
come, dependents and the standard of living which he needs or de- 
serves. By reposing the two powers in one state agency a close co- 
6rdination of the two functions may be realized. Thus both would 
become equally effective as agencies of control in various programs 
of social legislation of the states. 
Furthermore, the states, not Congress, have control over the col- 
lection devices which creditors may employ. In these collection 
devices are the beginnings of methods for proration and amortiza- 
tion.124 It seems desirable to build on these beginnings and to utilize 
to the fullest possible extent the administrative procedures and 
It should be noted, however, that these employees were of a relatively high income group. Further discussion of these cases and others from the same 
company is available in Fortas, op. cit. supra note 9. 
122. Sturges and Cooper, Credit Administration and Wage Earner Bank- 
ruptcies (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 487, 502-513. 
123. Cf. Fortas, Wage Assignments in Chicago-State Street Furniture 
Company v. Armour & Co. (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 526, passim. And see Nugent, Forgive Us Our Debts (1932) 16 PERSONAL FIN. NEWS 5. 124. Sturges and Cooper, Credit Administration and Wage Earner Bank- 
ruptcies (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 487, 517 et seq. 
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techniques which states have evolved or with which they have gained 
experience. The alternative of raising a new and huge federal super- 
structure to handle a function of some familiarity and experience 
in the states seems unwise. In conclusion it should be said that when 
creditors may apply pressure on their debtors and when the debtors 
may be relieved from such pressure are integral parts of the same 
problem. The former is and will continue to be a problem for the 
states since they rather than Congress have control over collection 
methods. To divide that function between state and nation by 
allocating to the federal bankruptcy courts the amortization power 
is but another step towards the division of responsibility with all 
of the disadvantages of lack of unified control. It would be but in- 
tensifying difficulties which have resulted from an exercise by Con- 
gress of the bankruptcy power over wage earners and the control 
of collection devices by the states. 
III 
The result of the present system is to superimpose one structure 
on another with but little articulation between the two. It is not 
merely that the various policies effectuated through the present bank- 
ruptcy act may contravene state policies as expressed by collection 
devices and many different types of regulation of business, social 
and economic conditions. The chief criticism is that under the present 
system the bankruptcy power remains practically unexploited as 
an agency of public control. It is not to be denied that the funda- 
mental problem suggested by wage and salary earner bankruptcies is 
an improvement in the management of consumer credit and a ration- 
alization of our economic order. But it is safe to say that many years 
will elapse until there has developed a more effective control over the 
flow of credit than we now have. And the time is probably far dis- 
tant when the unevenness in the economic order will be ironed out, 
when economic cataclysms will cease, and when the salaried group will 
have something more than their own resources with which to ab- 
sorb the shock of industrial displacements, financial disturbances 
and accidents and misfortunes of life. In other words we will con- 
tinue to have a great need for some system of bankruptcy to permit 
escape from unbearable burdens of debt and persistent pressure of 
creditors that take their toll in lowered standards of living, economic 
instability and fear and trembling. In planning for these con- 
tingencies it seems possible to improve a system so haphazard as 
the present. Today there is a uniform bankruptcy act for the nation. 
Yet bankruptcy is not uniform. It never can be until the economic 
and social problems in various localities are uniform. If the juris- 
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diction over wage earner bankrupts is retained by Congress, we will 
continue to have expressions of national policies on issues that are 
not national. 
One thing a study such as this for the whole nation would reveal 
would be the essentially local nature of the different conditions re- 
vealed. Wage assignments were immaterial in Boston and in New 
Jersey. Yet they rank high in importance in Chicago.125 Likewise, 
as has been shown, loan sharks are unimportant here; yet their im- 
portance to bankruptcy elsewhere is apparent.126 Local practices, 
credit controls, consumption habits, stability of employment vary 
much from state to state. These affect wage earner credit both quan- 
titatively and qualitatively. The incidence in each state (and perhaps 
in different localities in the same state) varies. To some extent at 
least the need for bankruptcy increases or decreases directly with 
the increase or decrease in the effectiveness from creditors' view- 
points of the various collection devices. Furthermore, what pressure 
devices creditors may employ and when debtors may be relieved of 
that pressure seem to be integral parts of the same problem. What 
these collection devices are and will continue to be are matters of 
state control. To articulate them in terms of bankruptcy and bank- 
ruptcy in terms of them seems essentially a local problem. At least 
the problem is an organic whole. And it seems susceptible of better 
treatment when considered as a local rather than a national one. 
Leaving to each state the control over the whole of these many 
problems would obviate the futility of trying to provide the same 
mechanism (bankruptcy) for many different or at least varying 
conditions. 
It cannot be supposed that the judgment of Congress is infinitely 
better than the judgment of those closer to the economic and social 
problems in the state. It is apparent that bankruptcy performs many functions. It may be serving as a safety valve for the enormous 
pressure of loan sharks, unemployment, medical costs, etc. Or it may 
reflect loose credit practices of retailers or the mounting costs of 
injuries for automobile accidents. These problems are not standard 
or the same throughout the nation. 
Furthermore, Congress, though it had the power, is not going to 
enter extensively into these fields of regulation. Reviewing the 
various problems revealed by the Boston and New Jersey bank- 
ruptcies it is seen that they are predominantly state, not federal, 
problems. Housing, home building, loan companies, credit unions, instalment selling, retail credit, unemployment, medical costs, auto- 
125. Fortas, Wage Assignments in Chicago-State Street Furniture Com- 
pany v. Armour & Co. (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 526. 
126. See Nugent, op. cit. supra note 10. 
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mobile accidents-all these as between state and nation are essentially 
the former's. Certainly it is difficult to see in them a primary place 
for federal programs of control. Perhaps some are not yet ripe for 
state programs of control. But that by no means earmarks them as 
being peculiarly appropriate for Federal regulation through the 
bankruptcy power. 
Two questions naturally arise. How would state bankruptcy acts 
vary from the present federal act if Congress did not exercise its 
constitutional power? In what way could the bankruptcy power in 
the hands of the states be made an effective agency of control? To 
answer these questions in detail is impossible, due to the fact that 
it would entail a comprehensive program of social legislation for 
forty-eight states and would call for determination of policies on a 
host of major social and economic issues. There are, however, sev- 
eral illustrative variations which may be propounded purely as 
possibilities. To cope with consumption credit conditions and prac- 
tices in a city like Chicago, a bankruptcy system might be devised 
which was extremely liberal to the wage earner debtor and which 
permitted him to be relieved of pressure of creditors with great 
facility. In an agrarian, rural section, where the problem was to 
encourage the flow of credit to wage earners, and where the abuses 
of consumption credit were minor, a bankruptcy system might be 
devised which was more favorable to the creditors, where discharges 
were more difficult to obtain, and where bankruptcy was less avail- 
able. Or, take the problem of automobile accidents. In states where 
the problem was acute, carrying of liability insurance might receive 
additional encouragement by denying an automatic discharge of such 
claims up to a certain amount. Or in case the claim arose out of a 
violation of a penal provision of the motor vehicle act, that claim 
might be treated more stringently than the ordinary automobile 
accident claim. In such cases the filing of a bankruptcy petition 
might not be allowed to give immunity from arrest. In states, how- 
ever, where the problem of automobile accidents was not deemed 
particularly acute, extreme liberality might be shown debtors. In 
Massachusetts it might be deemed desirable to incorporate the Poor 
Debtor Court into the bankruptcy court. In that way one agency 
would perform two closely related functions-the granting of a dis- 
charge to hopelessly involved wage earners, and the supervision of a 
proration or amortization program for those wage earners who could 
pay, if given time, without impairment of minimum standards of 
living. Not only would a more expeditious procedure result but 
there would follow a closer articulation between bankruptcy and 
collection methods. Similarly, in other states the procedure for 
garnishment of wages might be incorporated in a bankruptcy system 
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which placed all creditors on an equal footing and likewise provided 
for a discharge to the debtor where the garnishment would work an 
undue burden on him. By other methods the separate bankruptcy 
systems might go so far as to segregate for special treatment par- 
ticular types of creditors-such as unlicensed lenders-and give 
relief against such creditors more readily than against others. 
The foregoing are merely illustrative. The permutations and 
combinations are innumerable. What prophylactic effect could be 
obtained by the use of bankruptcy in connection with any one problem 
is not known. But if the states are given the power to legislate with 
the use of the bankruptcy power, an agency of control hitherto but 
little used can be fully exploited in many different programs of 
social planning. 
Two considerations remain. In the first place, where not all assets 
are within the state the advantages of a national, uniform system 
of liquidation are obvious. Collection of assets, liquidation, and dis- 
tribution of dividends are not hampered by state lines. But this 
problem is not acute in wage earner bankruptcies. As has been seen, 
about 85%o of them have no assets whatsoever. And judged by the 
Boston and New Jersey cases, which in this regard are no doubt 
representative, such assets as there are, are very rarely outside the 
state. Where creditors are widely scattered throughout the states, 
a national and uniform system may also have some advantages in 
making easier the filing of claims and participation in the process 
of liquidation. But that feature is not present here. The Boston 
and New Jersey wage earners had very few creditors outside the 
state. In that regard those cases are no doubt typical as it is difficult 
to imagine that the run of creditors in wage earner bankruptcies 
would be other than local. The advantages then of a national system 
of bankruptcy so frequently mentioned in cases of commercial fail- 
ures seem inapplicable here. Thus the need for uniformity disap- 
pears and along with it, its virtues and advantages. 
Secondly, a sudden repeal of the present bankruptcy act, so far 
as it affects wage earners, would probably be undesirable. Not all 
states are at present fully prepared to handle expeditiously and 
equitably the pressing problems of creditors and debtors. Without 
the aid of the present bankruptcy act, a genuine emergency might 
face many wage earners. Therefore, the suggestions here made 
are conceived of as parts of programs for long term planning. A 
repeal of the bankruptcy act to take effect at the end of a five year 
period would supply adequate time for the separate states to prepare 
for the event and to devise systems of bankruptcy consonant with 
other phases of their legislative programs.l27 In this connection the 
127. Of course, the bankruptcy power in the hands of the states cannot be 
made retroactive so as to impair obligations of contract. This interim be- 
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varied utility of the bankruptcy power should be noted. As an 
emergency measure it is conceivable that Congress would be justified 
in employing it for the relief of wage earners during a period of 
great economic instability provided the states were not giving ade- 
quate relief. Furthermore, though Congress relinquished control 
over wage earner bankruptcies, it might well exercise the bank- 
ruptcy power in some situations. It is not a question of complete 
retention or surrender by Congress. Rather it is a problem of de- 
termining in light of the exigencies of particular situations by whom 
and in what way the bankruptcy power should be exercised. 
As to commercial bankruptcies it is by no means clear that the 
present exclusive jurisdiction of Congress is desirable, although 
complete surrender of control as in case of wage earner bankruptcies 
would not be expedient in view of obvious procedural and adminis- 
trative difficulties. In case of railroads the full possibilities of bank- 
ruptcy as a device for their financing and reorganization has as yet 
not been fully appreciated. The fact of the matter is that the bank- 
ruptcy power of the constitution is one of the least exploited con- 
stitutional powers. But the realization of its greatest utility is not 
going to result if Congress continues to assert a primary and exclusive 
jurisdiction over all bankruptcies irrespective of their types. 
In conclusion then it can be said that as respects wage earner 
bankruptcies the present system treats the problems piecemeal, with 
the disadvantages of separation of control between state and nation. 
With the responsibility placed upon the states it seems likely that 
there would the sooner eventuate a more effective treatment and 
control of many problems whose incidence is measured in part by 
bankruptcy. At least it can be said that with the division of re- 
sponsibility as exists today haphazard treatment will continue and 
under the guise of the virtues of uniformity the continuance of the 
evils of maladjustments will be likely. Not until bankruptcy is 
thought of as a congeries of problems, such as housing, home buying, 
small loans, collection methods, unemployment, medical costs, retail 
credit practices, instalment buying, automobile accidents, etc., rather 
than as an institution, will more effective control over these problems 
and their various agencies eventuate. Relinquishment to the states 
of the bankruptcy power over wage earners increases the probability 
of the realization of that control. 
tween relinquishment of jurisdiction by Congress and assumption by the states 
can be employed to inaugurate state systems prospectively. In this way such 
constitutional difficulty could be minimized. There is moreover much to be said 
for taking this step at present when the lines of credit are at an exceedingly 
low ebb. 
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